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I. JURISDICTION
A.

IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION

IN FOWLER EVANGELISTIC ASS'N v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,'
the Eleventh Circuit held that a listing in a specialized
telephone directory did not create sufficient minimum
, 911 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1990).
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contacts to make the listed business subject to personal
jurisdiction in a foreign forum. The suit arose when the
plaintiff's airplane crashed en route to Florida shortly after a Mississippi fixed base operator (FBO) had repaired
it. The Florida district court dismissed the plaintiff's suit
for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, noting that
the FBO did not have offices, employees or agents in Florida and did not conduct any business in the state. Despite
being listed in the 1986-87 Aviation Telephone Directory,
whose distribution included Florida, the FBO had neither
paid for the listing nor purchased more prominent advertising within the Directory. The court held that "[e]ven if
the basic listings are considered 'advertisements,' they are
not enough, without more, to provide contacts which
comport with due process." 4 The court determined that
the "something more" was not satisfied by the FBO's
knowledge that the plane was headed to Florida rather
than to a location within Mississippi. 5 Furthermore, it was
not satisfied by any foreseeability that the FBO would service an airplane that would fly to Florida. Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court's dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction was proper.
B.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

(FSIA)

The Second Circuit in Barkanic v. General Administration
of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China 6 held that the
FSIA 7 implicitly required courts to apply choice-of-law
rules of the forum state concerning all issues governed by
state substantive law.8 In Barkanic, the estates of two
American citizens brought a wrongful death action after
their decedents were killed in the crash of a Chinese plane
Id. at 1566.
Id. at 1565.
4 Id. at 1566.
2
3

5Id.
6 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991).
7 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
8 Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 959.
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en route from Nanking to Bejing, China. New York
choice-of-law rules were applied because it was the forum
state which led to the application of Chinese law. 9 Applying Chinese substantive law, the airline's liability for the
wrongful death of a noncitizen was limited to $20,000.
In Antares Aircraft L.P. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,'0 the
court held that the defendants were immune from suit in
the United States because none of the statutory exceptions to the FSIA applied." A New York limited partnership brought an action to recover damages for conversion
of an aircraft. The alleged conversion took place when
the Nigerian Airports Authority (NAA) wrongfully imposed parking and landing fees upon the partnership's
aircraft, blocking its removal until the fees were paid.
The NAA asserted it was an instrumentality of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and, therefore, entitled to avail
itself of sovereign immunity under the FSIA. The district
court agreed and rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the
acts complained of fell into the exceptions set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a). It was determined that because the
forced transfer of funds was an indirect consequence of
the alleged tortious activity in Nigeria, the "direct effects"
test could not be used to invoke the commercial activities
exception of the FSIA.' 2 Simply because the NAA operated an international airport did not mean it was engaged
in commercial activity within the United States. Conse3
quently, the expropriation exception was Unavailable.'
Finally, the court noted that the noncommercial tort ex9 Id. at 960.
t0 No. CIV. 89-6513-JSM, 1991 WL 29287 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1), aff'd, 948 F.2d 90
(2d Cir. 1991),judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
H Id. at *4.
12 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) provides that immunity will not be available in cases
in which the activity is carried on "outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) provides that sovereign immunity will not be recognized for an action "in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue and that [the] property . . . is present in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state ....
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1988).
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ception was unavailable because the allegedly tortious
conduct occurred outside the United States.14 Thus, the
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss.
In Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. ,5 the Ninth Circuit stated "[a]lthough the general rule is 'that a federal
court sitting in diversity applies the conflict-of-law rules of
the state in which it sits,' [where] jurisdiction ... is based
on FSIA, not diversity ....federal common law applies to
the choice of law rule determination."' 16 Schoenberg was a
wrongful death suit brought against a Mexican corporation arising out of a fatal air crash that occurred in San
Diego, California, as the plane approached an airport in
Tijuana, Mexico. The court noted that federal common
law presumes that the law of the place where the injury
occurs applies, and because the presumption was not
overcome, California law was applied.17
In Trump Taj Mahal Assoc. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta S.p.A.,"8 the New Jersey district court held removal to federal district court was proper because
Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta S.p.A.
(Agusta) was a "foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. § 1603.'9
The plaintiffs, employers of three executives who died
1 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) provides that immunity will not be recognized in an
action "against a foreign state for personal injury ... or damage to or loss of
property, occurring in the United States ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988).
15 930 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1991).
16 Id. at 782 (citations omitted).
17 Id. at 783.
18761 F. Supp. 1143 (D.N.J. 1991).
1928 U.S.C. § 1603 provides in part:
(a) A "foreign state" ... includes a political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in
subsection (b).
(b) An "agency of instrumentality of a foreign state" means any en-

tity
-

(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise; and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or a political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof; and
(3) which is neither a citizen of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of
any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1988).
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when an Agusta A109 helicopter crashed, sued Agusta in
New Jersey state court for wrongful death damages.
Agusta removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1604.20 Despite the plaintiff's assertion that
§ 1603(b)(2) did not contemplate that a private corporation could be owned by a foreign government, the court
held it was irrelevant whether the entity was a public corporation or a private corporation, so long as the Italian
government held a majority interest.2
Furthermore, the plaintiffs' assertion that Agusta was a
citizen of the United States because it maintained a Delaware based wholly-owned subsidiary was rejected by the
court. The Agusta court held that a foreign corporation
does not become a United States citizen by the mere fact
of its ownership of a United States subsidiary.2 2 A corporation is deemed to be a citizen of any state in which it has
its principal place of business,2 3 and Agusta's principal
place of business was Milan, Italy. Therefore, removal
was proper, and the court held for defendants on the
merits .24
C.

FORUM NON CONVENIENS

In Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,25 the Third Circuit reversed the district court for the second time 26 and held
that the nature of the balancing of public and private interests articulated in GulfOil Corp. v. Gilbert 27 is essentially
20 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988). The statute provides in part that "a foreign state
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter." Id.
21 Trump Taj MahalAssoc., 761 F. Supp. at 1151.
22 Id.; see Bailey v. Grand Trunk Lines, 609 F. Supp. 48 (D. Vt. 1984), aff'd in
part, 805 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987).
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1988).
24 Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 761 F. Supp. at 1151.
25 932 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1991).
26 See Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 674 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. Pa. 1987), rev'd, 862
F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1988), on remand, 736 F. Supp. 662 (W.D. Pa. 1990), rev'd, 932
F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1990).
27 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (forum non conveniens analysis includes balancing
eleven private and public interest factors).

8
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qualitative. 28 The court rejected a quantitative analysis
which would allow removal if the majority of factors were
satisfied. Lacey arose out of an aircraft crash in British Columbia, Canada, in which Lacey, an Australian citizen, was
severely burned. 29 Lacey brought suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania, the domicile of Hanlon & Wilson,
the manufacturer of the allegedly defective exhaust system. The district court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds and suggested
British Columbia was an appropriate alternative forum."
On appeal, a divided Third Circuit held that the district
court had abused its discretion by quantitatively evaluating the Gulf Oil factors, rather than engaging in a qualitative analysis. 3 The district court had failed to accord
sufficient weight to the question of what difficulties Lacey
might face in obtaining discovery from nonparties who
were in possession of records relevant to the litigation.
One such non-party was Wall Colmonoy, an Oklahoma
based business, which had subsequently acquired Hanlon
& Wilson. The court stated "we have neither substituted
our judgment for that of the district court nor reduced the
multi-factor Gulf Oil/Piper32 analysis to one factor [access
to sources of proof]. We instead have read Piper as prescribing a qualitative not quantitative balancing. ' 33 Thus,
the court remanded with orders to reconsider whether
British Columbia's discovery rules would afford the plaintiff access to essential sources of proof at trial with the
understanding that much of the evidence necessary to the
plaintiff's action might be outside of the defendant's
control.34
On remand, the district court determined that because
the plaintiff could not specifically state what witnesses and
28

Lacey, 932 F.2d at 182.

29 Id.
30

See Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 674 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. Pa 1987).

s Lacey, 932 F.2d at 182.
12

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981).

33 Lacey, 932 F.2d at 186.
34

Id.
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documents were critical without discovery, it would be
35
speculation for the court to make such a determination.
The court stated "[i]n view of our singular lack of success
so far in addressing the issues which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit deems vital on this
3 6
question, we refuse to engage in such speculation.
Consequently, the court denied defendants' motion to
dismiss. The court held that the case should proceed until the close of discovery and that it would reexamine the
if the defendants wanted to
forum non conveniens issue
37
represent it at that time.
In Martino v. VARIG, S.A.,38 the court held that a party
dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens was still
subject to the court's jurisdiction.3 9 The plaintiffs
brought suit in the United States against Boeing, the manufacturer of an aircraft involved in a crash in Brazil. The
court granted Boeing's motion to dismiss on the grounds
of forum non conveniens. 40 However, the court's order
required Boeing to submit to service of process in Brazil,
waive certain aspects of any statute of limitations, comply
with federal court style discovery, and satisfy any judgment rendered against it by a Brazilian court. 4 ' Furthermore, should Boeing fail to satisfy any of the conditions,
the court stated it would reinstate jurisdiction upon request and reopen the action. The court did not explain its
authority to direct Boeing to comply with these orders,
nor did the court explain by what authority it could obtain
jurisdiction since its analysis had already led it to the conclusion that suit in the United States was improper.
In Myers v. Boeing Co. ,42 the Supreme Court of Washington criticized and declined to follow the "lesser defer-

36

Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 785 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
Id.

37

Id.

15

38

No. CIV.A.90-1883, 1991 WL 13886 (E.D. La. Jan. 25, 1991).

39

Id. at *7.

40

41
42

Id.
Id.
794 P.2d 1272 (Wash. 1990).
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ence" standard articulated by the United States Supreme
Court plurality in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.43 The suit
arose as a result of a crash in which a Boeing 747 owned
by Japan Air Lines (JAL) crashed en route from Tokyo to
Osaka, Japan, killing 520 people. The court noted that
the ordinarily persuasive authority of Reyno was undermined by the fact that only a four-justice plurality con44
curred with the lesser in deference standard holding.
Additionally, the court held Reyno "purports to be giving
lesser deference to the foreign plaintiffs' choice of forum
when, in reality, it is giving lesser deference to foreign
plaintiffs, based solely on their status as foreigners. ' 45 The
court questioned why it is less reasonable to assume that a
plaintiff, who is a Japanese citizen residing in Wenatchee,
Washington, who brings a suit in Washington, has chosen
a less convenient forum than a plaintiff from Florida
bringing the same suit. Finally, the court said it was unnecessary to adopt the Reyno rationale because the GulfOil
factors, properly applied, were sufficient to ensure fair
and equitable results.4 6 Thus, the court affirmed dismissal
the proper conclusion
because the trial court had reached
47
despite improper reasoning.
D.

REMOVAL

In Mignogna v. Sair Aviation, Inc. ,48 the court held that:
(1) an action against a Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentality (NAFI) activity was not subject to removal as an action against an "officer of the United States or [of] a
federal agency,"' 49 and (2) absent certainty that state court
jurisdiction would be barred, remand was required. 50 In
Mignogna, a single-engine Mooney aircraft piloted by
4- See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 232.
44 Myers, 794 P.2d at 1280.

45 Id. at 1281.
46

Id.

47 Id.
48 937 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1991).
49 Id. at 41.
50 Id. at 43.
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Mignogna crashed at the Burlington, Vermont International Airport. Mignogna commenced an action in state
court alleging that Hancock, a NAFI, had leased the aircraft to Mignogna and that Mignogna suffered injuries in
the plane crash as a result of Hancock's negligence, recklessness and carelessness. The United States petitioned
for removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) 5 t on the
ground that Hancock was an instrumentality of the federal
government by virtue of 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c) 5 2 and 10
U.S.C. § 9779(c). 53 The district court accepted jurisdiction and subsequently dismissed the case on other
grounds.
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that removal was
improper.5 4 The court determined that "Hancock, an impersonal entity, was not an officer of the United States,
and thus could validly effect removal under section
1442(a)(1) only if that section authorized removal by an
'agency' of the United States." ' 55 The court noted that in
InternationalPrimate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund,56 the United States Supreme Court
had recently ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) did not
provide the necessary authorization.5 7 In InternationalPrimate, the Supreme Court held, "when construed in the relevant context, the first clause of § 1442(a)(1) grants
5128

U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988) provides:
A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a state court
against any of the following persons may be removed by them to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or per-

son acting under him, for any act under color of such office or on
account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.
52 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c) (1988) describes which individuals are considered government employees when they are paid from nonappropriated funds and states that
NAFI's are instrumentalities of the federal government.
53 10 U.S.C. § 9779(b) (1988).
54 937 F.2d at 41.
55 Id. at 40.
56 111 S. Ct. 1700 (1991).
57 937 F.2d at 40.

12
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removal power to only one grammatical subject, '[a]ny officer,' which is then modified by a compound prepositional phrase: 'of the United States or [of] any agency
thereof.' -58 Consequently, jurisdiction was improper because 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(2) did not authorize an agency
to remove an action. 9
However, the court noted that remand might be improper if it would be futile. This would exist, for example, if the state court could not exercise jurisdiction over
Mignogna's claim against Hancock. 60 In InternationalPrimate, the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of a
futility exception to the explicit remand rule of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c), and determined that they were precluded from
determining futility of a remand due to uncertainties of
the case. 6 ' The Second Circuit noted that the government's petition for removal asserted only that the NAFI's
activities were considered instrumentalities of the federal
government and did not assert that appropriated funds
were at stake in the litigation.62 The court noted that
Congress had clearly expressed its intention that no appropriated funds be used to support NAFI activities and
that revenue from nonappropriated fund activities must
be severed from general federal revenues.65 Therefore,
NAFI funds had an identity apart from that of treasury
funds. The court held NAFI might be subject to claims
directly against them and their nonappropriated assets, as
distinct from claims against the United States and the
public fisc. 64 Consequently, the court held a remand to
state court would not be futile because it was uncertain
whether Hancock possessed assets subject to state court
jurisdiction.65
58 111 S. Ct. at 1705.

5 Id. at 1709.
937 F.2d at 41.
61 111 S. Ct. at 1709.
62 937 F.2d at 43.
63 Id. at 42 (citing United States v. Hopkins, 427 U.S. 123, 125 (1976)).
64 937 F.2d at 42.
65 Id. at 43.
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In Vail v. Pan Am Corp.,66 the court held that the plaintiffs' claims were not preempted by the complete preemption doctrine 67 and remanded the action to state court.
The plaintiffs, whose decedents died when Flight 103
crashed near Lockerbie, Scotland, sued Pan Am in New
Jersey state court, alleging fraud, consumer fraud, and
breach of contract because Pan Am had represented that
it was implementing a sophisticated security system which
it did not in fact implement. Pan Am removed the action
to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction and plaintiffs sought remand.
The court noted that federal question jurisdiction can
only be established if a federal cause of action was
presented in a well-pleaded complaint. 68 The plaintiffs
had intentionally not met this requirement. Nonetheless,
Pan Am asserted removal was proper because it intended
to assert that the Federal Aviation Act (the Act) 69 pre-

empted the plaintiffs' state law claims. The court noted,
however, that a case may not be removed to federal court
on the basis of a federal defense to a state law claim.7 °
The court also rejected Pan Am's assertion that the "complete preemption" doctrine converted plaintiffs' state
claim into one stating a federal claim for the purposes of
the well-pleaded complaint rule. 7' The court held that for

the Act to create removal jurisdiction, the Act "must contain a civil enforcement provision and such provision
must have been intended by Congress to create a basis for
removal.

' 72

Thus, removal jurisdiction was not proper

because the Act contained no such provision.73
752 F. Supp. 648 (D.N.J. 1990).
Id. at 656; see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968) (employer's state claim under a no-strike clause was deemed to have arisen under the
laws of the United States).
" Vail, 752 F. Supp. at 655 (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
392 (1987)).
69 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
70 Vail, 752 F. Supp. at 655 (quoting Caterpillar,482 U.S. at 393).
71 Id. at 659.
72 Id.
73 Id.
66
67

14
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SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

In Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc. ,74 the court held that
state law claims of negligent maintenance were not completely preempted by federal law and remanded the action
to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.75 The
plaintiff alleged that he was injured when the airplane he
was travelling in suffered a deflated nose wheel and began
shaking. He sued in Texas state court alleging the defendants were negligent in failing to properly maintain
their aircraft, failing to correct unsafe conditions and contracting with and transporting passengers on a regional
carrier which did not properly maintain its aircraft. The
defendants removed the action to federal court relying on
the "complete pre-emption" doctrine.76
The defendants noted that the Federal Aviation Act
specifically pre-empted all state law claims to the extent
that such claims "relat[e] to rates, routes or services or
any air carrier .... "77 The defendants asserted that the
plaintiff's claims were necessarily related to services and
were therefore pre-empted. The court rejected the defendants' argument for two reasons. Initially, the cases
supporting defendants' position "involved services provided by individual airline employees directly to passengers, such as ticketing, boarding, in-flight service, and the
like," whereas in the present case, plaintiff's claims did
not arise out of the allegedly negligent performance of
such services. 78 Secondly, assuming the defendants' assertion were valid, then most if not all state law claims
would be preempted by the Act. 79 However, the court
noted several federal decisions in which such claims were
not preempted."0 Moreover, the court noted that the
74 776 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
75 Id. at 1199-1200.

See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987).
Stewart, 776 F. Supp. at 1196 (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1991)).
78 776 F. Supp. at 1197.
76

17

79 Id.
80 Id.

at 1198.
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Fifth Circuit had recently held jurisdiction was properly
retained in an indistinguishable case. In Seidman v. American Airlines, Inc. ,81 a plaintiff incurred injuries following an
aircraft captain's orders to evacuate the airplane by using
the emergency slides. The plaintiff brought a diversity action in federal district court alleging solely state law
claims. The Stewart court noted that had the Act completely preempted the plaintiff's state law claims, the district court would have had no basis for retaining subject
matter jurisdiction."2 In that case, the Fifth Circuit would
have been obliged to dismiss the appeal on its own motion. Because the Fifth Circuit did not dismiss in Seidman,
the Stewart court held that the Act did not preempt Stewart's claims.8 3 Therefore defendants' "complete preemp84
tion" position was without merit.
In Lloyd's Syndicate 609 v. United States, s5 underwriters at
Lloyd's brought a subrogation action against the United
States in federal court seeking reimbursement of a onetime one million dollar payment to its insured, Helitaxi,
Ltd. Helitaxi was the Colombian owner of a Grumman G1 Aircraft which was declared a total loss as a result of
extensive damage suffered during the United States bombardment of Panama's Paitilla Airport in 1989.
Underwriters asserted jurisdiction under the Prize
Act,8 6 the Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA),s 7 the Suits in
Admiralty Act,8 8 the Public Vessels Act, 9 the Foreign
Claims Act, 90 and the All Writs Act. 9 ' The court rejected
81 923 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1991).
82

Stewart, 776 F. Supp. at 1200.

83

Id.

Id.
8- 780 F.Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Id. at 1000. The Prize Act and the Prize Law permit suits in Federal Court to
determine title or payment for items captured during times of belligerency which
are intended for use by the United States or its agents. See U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2; 28 U.S.C. 88 1333, 1356 (1988).
87 28 U.S.C §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988).
88 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1988).
89 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1988).
90 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1988).
91 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988).
84
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each basis of jurisdiction and dismissed the action.9"
The court first held the destruction of property during
combat was not a taking, capture or seizure within the
meaning of the Prize Act.93 The court stated:
To rule otherwise is to suggest that the United States
would be liable for the wartime destruction of any property owned by any person, save for that either owned or
being used by the armed forces of the other belligerent
nation. This clearly is not and cannot be the law.94
Underwriters also asserted that jurisdiction was supported because the United States had waived sovereign
immunity. However, the court held that even if that assertion were true, jurisdiction was improper.95 The court
noted that the FTCA did not apply because the claim did
not arise within the United States.9 6 The Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act were inapplicable because land forces, not vessels, were responsible for the
damage to the aircraft. 97 And finally, as neither the Foreign Claims Act nor the All Writs Act contained a waiver
of sovereign immunity provision, they did not supply
grounds for exercising jurisdiction." Accordingly, the
court granted the United States' motion to dismiss. 99
In RLI Insurance Co. v. United States Aviation Underwriters
Inc.,'00 following Carden v. Arkoma Associates, I ° ' the court
held that the citizenship of every member of an unincorporated entity must be considered for diversity purposes. 10 2 RLI, a citizen of Illinois, sued United States
Aviation Underwriters, Inc. (USAU), a citizen of New
York, for injuries incurred in an aircraft crash. USAU was
92

Lloyd's, 780 F. Supp. at 1000-01.

95 Id. at 1000.
4

Id.

9s Id.
0 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1988).
97 Loyd's, 780 F. Supp. at 1000-01.
98 Id. at 1001,
9 Id.
-00 739 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. I1. 1990).
10, 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
102

RLS Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. at 1221.
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also the aviation manager for United States Aircraft Insurance Group (USAIG), a coalition of independent insurance companies who had insured the aircraft's owner.
Two USAIG members were Illinois citizens. The court
held that an action brought against USAU necessarily included USAIG as the real party in interest. 0 3 The court
viewed USAU and USAIG as two partners, each of whom
performed a particular task for the benefit of the partnership. Because the action involved a matter related to the
business of the single entity comprised of USAU and
USAIG, such as providing insurance for all aviation risks,
it was appropriate to consider the citizenship of every
member of USAIG. Because USAIG, a coalition of independent insurance companies, included members with
the same citizenship as the plaintiff, diversity was destroyed and the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In Rodrigue v. United States,' °4 the court held that claims
settled under the Military Claims Act (MCA)10 5 were final
with respect to administrative review only and not with respect to judicial review.'0 6 The plaintiff alleged the
United States Air Force owed his son, an airman, a duty to
rescue him from drowning. The Department of the Air
Force rejected the plaintiff's claim for damages because
the airman's death was "incident to service." The plaintiff
exhausted his administrative remedies and filed suit in
federal court seeking a declaratory judgment stating that
the Air Force misinterpreted the "incident to service" exception. The United States filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court reviewed the legislative history of the MCA
to determine the meaning of "final and conclusive". The
court noted that in the section entitled "purpose of the
Legislation" the United States Senate had stated: "The
o3 Id. at 1220.
- 760 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1991).
t05 10 U.S.C. §§ 2731-2737 (1988).
-6 Rodrique, 760 F. Supp. at 226.
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proposed legislation would be consistent with the cited
general policy of preventing other agencies of the Government from reviewing and reversing actions on claim settlements of agencies specifically authorized to settle and
pay certain claims."'' 0 7 Therefore, the language did not
preclude judicial review. Consequently, the court held
that it had subject matter jurisdiction of plaintiff's
claim.10 8
F. ABSTENTION
In Neuchatel Swiss General Insurance Co. v. Lufthansa Airlines,' 0 9 the pendency of parallel proceedings in Geneva,
Switzerland was an insufficient justification to apply the
Colorado River abstention doctrine. 110 The suit arose out
of an ordinary commercial dispute over the loss of cargo
involving the owner, the consignee, the cargo's insurer,
and the air carrier to whom the cargo was entrusted. The
Ninth Circuit held that a federal court owes less deference
to a foreign court than to a state court."' That the parallel proceeding was pending in a foreign jurisdiction
weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction, not
2
abstaining." 1
II.
A.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

EAST RIVER STEAMSHIP DOCTRINE"

3

Many cases follow the lead of the United States
Supreme Court in East River and hold that an action in
107 Id.

at 225-26 (quoting S.REP. No. 1056, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess., 5 (1972), re-

printed in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3106, 3109-10).
108760 F. Supp. at 226.
-0 925 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1991).
11 Id. at 1194; see Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976) (absent "exceptional circumstances," federal courts
have an obligation to exercise their jurisdiction concurrently with other courts).
- Lufthansa, 925 F.2d at 1195.
112 Id.
113East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986)
(striking tort claims of oil-tanker operator which brought negligence and strict
liability action against manufacturer of propulsion engine which malfunctioned
causing commercial losses).
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tort may not be maintained between commercial parties
for economic losses arising from a defective product when
there is no injury other than to the product itself." 4
The issue of what constitutes damage to "other property" has been addressed as well. In Lease Navajo, Inc. v.
Cap Aviation, Inc.,' ' for example, the court held that the
failure of an engine component which caused the whole
engine to explode constituted damage to other distinct
property and did not preclude an action solely for economic damages. "6 In Lease Navajo, the plaintiffs brought
a successful action against Cap Aviation Inc. (Cap) for
damage sustained when two aircraft engines rebuilt by
Cap exploded. Subsequently, Cap filed a third-party complaint against the engine manufacturer, Avco Lycoming,
for contribution and indemnity. Cap asserted Lycoming
breached its warranties of merchantability and fitness because the engine's technical manual directed Cap to rebuild the engine with outdated components. Cap sought
recovery of the costs incurred in repairing the aircraft, replacing the engines and cores, and travelling to the location of the explosion to complete the repairs. Lycoming
moved for summary judgment, asserting that Pennsylvania does not allow recovery by a commercial purchaser against a manufacturer of a product in a tort action
where the only injury is to the product itself.
The court denied Lycoming's motion, distinguishing
cases where a plaintiff purchased a multi-part integrated
product and a single part failed.' '7 In integrated purchase
114 E.g., King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1050-54 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989) (applying East River to case involving allegedly defective sprout suppressant used on seed potatoes); Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip.
Co., 816 F.2d 110, 118 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987) (applying East
River principle to Pennsylvania products liability case involving fire damage to a
tractor); McKernan v. United Technologies Corp., 717 F. Supp. 60, 62-64 (D.
Conn. 1989); Florida Power & Light Co. v. McGraw Edison Co., 696 F. Supp. 617,
619-20 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying East River
to case involving economic damages caused by transformer explosion at power
generating plant).
"1 760 F. Supp. 455 (E.D. Pa. 1991).

116Id. at 460.
17

Id. at 459; see also Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.
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cases, whether the destruction was either to the single
part only, or to the entire unit, the courts have held the
damage was to the product itself.I"8 However, in the present case the engines and the allegedly defective components were not purchased as an integrated unit. Rather,
Cap purchased a component part which it then installed
in a Lycoming engine. The court stated that "[n]owhere
does it appear that Cap Aviation purchased the engines
and the components as a whole. The failure of the component caused damage to other distinct property. '" 9
Reaching the contrary result in Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.
v. Avco Corp. ,1othe court held that an emergency flotation
device was a "component part" of a helicopter, was not
"other property," and therefore the owner could not
maintain a strict products liability claim under maritime
tort law.' 2 ' Petroleum Helicopters sought recovery for
damages sustained by its helicopter when it capsized after
the defendant's emergency flotation device failed. The
float had been manufactured according to the helicopter
manufacturer's specifications and assembled and sold as
an integrated whole. The failed float was not original
equipment on the crashed helicopter because the plaintiff
routinely interchanged floats between similar helicopters.
The district court held that East River applied to the case
and granted summary judgment for defendants which was
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 2 2 The
court also held that the plaintiff's recovery was governed
by the terms of its contract and agreed that the plaintiff
should not be able to interchange the flotation devices
and thereby create an additional non-warranty remedy. 23
1987) (faulty hose mechanism damaged entire shovel unit); Hammerville Paper
Co. v. C.T. Main Constr., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (heating tubes in
boiler failed destroying boiler).
118Cap Aviation, 760 F. Supp. at 459.
119

Id.

120930 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1991).
121 Id.

at 393.
at 389.
,25Id. at 393.
122Id.
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Similarly, in National Union FireInsurance Co. of Pittsburgh,
PA v. Pratt and Whitney Canada, Inc. ,124 the Supreme Court
of Nevada held that an airplane engine and the airplane
itself are a single integrated product for the purposes of a
law suit in products liability, 25 The action arose out of
the total loss of a Piper Model PA-3 IT Cheyenne II which
crashed when a compressor blade in one of two Pratt and
Whitney Model PT6A-28 engines malfunctioned. The
court recognized that the engine was a defective component part of the Piper and arguably destroyed other property, i.e., the entire airplane. The court agreed, however,
with the United State's Supreme Court's reasoning in East
River that "[s]ince all but the very simplest of machines
have component parts, [a contrary] holding would require
a finding of 'property damage' in virtually every case
where a product damages itself. Such a holding would
eliminate the distinction between warranty and strict
26
products liability." 1
The court was greatly persuaded by the availability of
insurance to cover such risks. The court stated:
"[c]ommercial products that may, for whatever reason, injure themselves are readily insured and suitable for inclusion within the economic loss doctrine. . . . When a
product 'injures itself' protection derived from the interplay of manufacturer's warranties and insurance supplies
a generally adequate basis for consumer redress."'' 27 For
similar reasons, the court held that tort damages were not
available even though the product crashed calamitously
and exposed persons to unreasonable risks of harm. 2 1
Consequently, plaintiffs' subrogee could not recover from
the manufacturer on a strict liability theory because the
damage was an economic loss.
124815 P.2d 601
125Id. at 604.

(Nev. 1991).

126 Id. (quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858,
867 (1985) (quoting Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
623 P.2d 324, 330 (Alaska 1981))).
127 815 P.2d at 604-05.
18 Id. at 605.
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In Aris Helicopters, Ltd. v. Allison Gas Turbine, 129 the Ninth
Circuit held East River would control the resolution of a
California tort action only if it were brought in admiralty.' 30 The plaintiff alleged it incurred economic damages because its helicopter crashed due to defendants'
defective design and manufacture.' 3 ' The court held that
proper authority in California is ScandinavianAirlines System
v. United Aircraft Corp.,132 which adopted the rule enunci33
ated in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Electronic Corp..1
Although the district court applied the proper test, the
Ninth Circuit held that the court erred by dismissing the
complaint for failure to state a claim. 3 4 The court also
determined the Kaiser Steel factors were too complicated to
35
be determined on a motion to dismiss.1
B.

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE

In Skyline Air Service, Inc. v. G. L. Capps Co. ,136 the Fifth
Circuit held that the failure to provide the original government contract did not preclude partial summary judgment on the issue of the government contractor
defense. 3 7 In Skyline, a military surplus Bell Model UKlB helicopter owned by Skyline Air Service, Inc. crashed
during a log hauling operation. The crash killed the pilot
and damaged the aircraft extensively. The National
Transportation Safety Board concluded the crash was
caused by engine failure. Americas Insurance Company
- 932 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 827.

130

"'
Plaintiffs alleged the crash of the helicopter caused damage to the helicopter
itself and a loss of income to Aris along with additional insurance expenses and
the expenses of the lease for a substitute helicopter in the total amount of
$509,677.33. Id. at 826.
132 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979).
'33 127 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (1976) (product liability does not apply between
parties who (1) "deal in a commercial setting;" (2) are in "positions of relatively
equal economic strength;" (3) "bargain the specifications of the product;" and (4)
"negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects" in the product).
134 Allison Gas Turbine, 932 F.2d at 827.
1- Id.
136 916 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1990).
37 Id. at 980.
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filed a subrogation claim against Bell and others. Bell
moved for summary judgment, raising the government
contractor defense.
The court applied the three-part test set forth in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp. 138 In Boyle, the United States
Supreme Court held,
liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be
imposed, pursuant to state law, when: 1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; 2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and 3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the
use of the equipment that 39were known to the supplier but
not to the United States.1
The Skyline court held Bell's inability to produce the original government contract for the crashed helicopter did
not prevent satisfaction of the first prong of the Boyle
test.140 The court found Bell had presented sufficient evidence to establish that the United States approved reasonably precise specifications, especially in light of the
plaintiff's failure to challenge any of the information or
produce contradictory evidence.' 4 ' Similarly, Bell was
able to produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the second
and third prongs. Therefore, summary judgment was
appropriate.
In In re Air Crash Litigation Frederick, Maryland, 42 the
court held that the government contractor defense applies
where the "discretionary function" exception to the
FTCA would prevent liability on the part of the federal
government in the area of military procurement. 43 The
case arose when an Air Force EC-135N aircraft crashed
killing all aboard. The personal representatives of the
military and civilian decedents brought a products liability
138Id. at

979; Boyle, 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
487 U.S. at 512.
140 G.L. Capps, 916 F.2d at 979-80.
14' Id. at 980.
142 752 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D. Ohio 1990), aff'd sub nom, Darling v. Boeing Co.,
935 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1991).
143 Id. at 1336.
139
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suit alleging that the aircraft was defectively designed.
The court engaged in an extensive analysis and held that
Boeing, the aircraft manufacturer, Lear, the manufacturer
of the allegedly defective autopilot, and McDonnell Douglas Corporation, the aftermarket installer of the autopilot,
were all entitled to immunity as a matter of law. The
court held that approval of "reasonably precise specifications" was satisfied because the government had exercised its discretion with regard to the design of the
particular piece of equipment, instead of simply ordering
it from stock. 44 Discretion was expressed through engineering analysis, through the exercise of judgment regarding technical and military factors, and through the
evaluation of trade-offs between safety and mission effectiveness. The court noted that if the three Boyle elements
were met, the requisite "significant conflict" was present
and state law claims were preempted. 4 - Furthermore, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the defendants
were negligent in failing to flight-test the aircraft, and
therefore Boyle was inapplicable. The negligence claims
were indistinguishable from the defective design allegations to which Boyle was applicable and were also
barred. 146
C.

PROOF OF DEFECT

In Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,"4 the Tenth Circuit,
applying New Mexico law, held that an initial tortfeasor,
whose negligence may be deemed to have proximately
caused all of the injuries, is or at least may be a concurrent tortfeasor with a crashworthiness tortfeasor as to the
enhanced injuries.' 48 Cleveland arose from a bizarre set of
facts. A Piper Super Cub Model PA-18-150 aircraft taking
off from Mid-Valley Airport in Los Lunas, New Mexico,
144
145
146
147

148

Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1364.
890 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1549.
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crashed into a van deliberately parked on the runway by
the airport owner. The owner had previously warned
Cleveland, the pilot, that he was suspending airport operations because certain glider flights were not in compliance with Federal Aviation Administration regulations.
The collision injured the pilot, who was sitting in the rear
seat, which was equipped only with a lap belt, not a shoulder harness. He was thrown into a camera affixed to the
front seat. The camera was installed to film a glider attached to the plane by a tow line. Cleveland sued Piper
alleging that the aircraft was defectively designed because
it had inadequate forward vision (the initial collision
claim) and because it lacked a rear seat shoulder harness
(the crashworthiness claim). The jury found Piper's negligence accounted for 41.7% of the initial collision damages and 91.6% of the crashworthiness damages. The
court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an
amount derived by multiplying the total damages
($2,500,000) by the percentage of fault allocated to the
initial collision. Because the plaintiff sustained only head
injuries, the jury found 100% of plaintiff's injuries were
attributable to the airplane's lack of a rear shoulder
harness.
The plaintiff asserted that the initial and crashworthiness tortfeasors were successive tortfeasors because no injuries were attributable to the initial collision. The
plaintiff further asserted that New Mexico's pure comparative fault law was inapplicable because it eliminated joint
and several liability only as between concurrent
tortfeasors. Consequently, the plaintiff contended that
the district court erred in entering judgment on the first
collision claim instead of on the crashworthiness claim because the negligence of the initial tortfeasors should not
have been compared to the negligence of the crashworthiness tortfeasors.
The court acknowledged that the jury's finding that
100% of the damages were attributable to the
crashworthiness injuries represented an implicit finding
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that the plaintiff would not have received any injuries as a
result of the initial collision. The court, however, declined to accept the plaintiff's reasoning that the verdict
also represented an implicit finding that the negligence of
the original tortfeasors was not a proximate cause of the
crashworthiness injuries. 149 Even though the relationship
was that of successive tortfeasors, the court noted that
under New Mexico law both the initial tortfeasors and the
crashworthiness tortfeasors may be liable for the second
collision or enhanced injuries. 50 Nevertheless, because
the verdict form did not permit the jury to compare the
negligence of the initial tortfeasors with that of the
crashworthiness tortfeasors, the court remanded for a
new trial. 151
D.

NON-LIABILITY FOR FORMER MANUFACTURERS

In Goldsmith v. Olon Andrews, Inc. ,152 the Sixth Circuit, applying Ohio law, held that a manufacturer who had ceased
manufacturing a product and who no longer sold the design for that product was not a seller for the purposes of
establishing liability under Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A. 153 In 1984, Andrews and Goldsmith were injured
when Andrews' Bell 47 helicopter crashed and caught fire.
The plaintiffs' injuries were primarily due to the fire and
Andrews died as a result of burn injuries. The plaintiffs
brought suit alleging Bell was strictly liable because it had
negligently designed the Bell 47's fuel system.
The court found the following facts: (1) the crashed helicopter had been assembled by Olympic Helicopters, a
third party, from spare, new, and surplus parts acquired
from various sources, including Bell; (2) Bell had ceased
manufacturing the Bell 47 in 1974; however, it had continued to provide product support to operators of Model
149

Id. at 1548.

1- Id. at 1550.
51

Id. at 1557.

941 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1991).
,55 Id. at 427.
152
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47s; and (3) in 1976, Bell improved the crashworthiness
of the fuel system for the Model 47 by providing retrofit
kits for fiberglass-wrapped fuel tanks and breakaway fittings for the fuel lines. Bell notified existing owners, including Olympic, of the improvement. Olympic, however,
had not included the improvements because FAA regulations did not require their inclusion on existing
helicopters.
The court held that in order to satisfy the rationale for
strict liability, Bell must be deemed a seller. 54 The court
noted Bell had never licensed, sanctioned, nor approved
Olympic's use of Bell's design to manufacture the helicopter. Furthermore, Bell did not control production of the
helicopter, could not assure conformity with its improved
designs, and was in no position to treat the risks of producing the helicopter as costs of production or to obtain
liability insurance. 55 Consequently, the court affirmed
the lower court's grant of a directed verdict in favor of
1 56
Bell.
E.
1.

EVIDENCE

Evidence of pilot's prior navigationalerror.

In Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,'7 the court held that
the evidence of a pilot's prior conduct was relevant to
prove what actually happened at the time of the accident. "58
' The plaintiff's decedent died when his Beech
King Air B-90 crashed on approach to the Joliet Airport.
The plaintiff alleged the crash occurred because the aircraft's left propeller went into reverse pitch, and the
plaintiff further asserted that evidence of the pilot's conduct prior to the crash was irrelevant. The court noted,
however, that the evidence showed that the pilot was spatially disoriented throughout the entire hour-long flight.
114Id. at 426.
15, Id. at 427.
156 Id.
.57 568 N.E.2d 46 (1991).
158

Id. at 51.
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The court held that the evidence was unlike a momentary
aberration which, if uncontradicted, would allow a finding
that the conditions were the same until the moment of the
crash.' 59 Instead, the court held that the evidence tended
to show what probably happened and the evidence supported a reasonable inference that the conduct involved
continued from the point of observation to the place of
60
the accident.
2.

Miscellaneous

In Western Helicopter Services, Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft
Corp.,16t the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for relief
from summary judgment on the basis of newly discovered
evidence. 62 In Western Helicopter, the plaintiffs' decedent
was killed in a helicopter crash caused by the failure of the
helicopter's main rotor blade fork. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' theory that because the defendant
was the sole supplier of forks to the plaintiff during the
period in which the accident fork was installed, the defendant's fork was the accident fork. Consequently, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiffs had produced no evidence that
63
the accident fork was manufactured by the defendant.
Two weeks prior to the entry ofjudgment, the plaintiffs'
expert examined and tested certain forks. After entry of
judgment, based on those tests, the plaintiffs' expert concluded that the defendant had manufactured the accident
fork. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, which the
64
court granted.
The court noted that in order to grant relief, the mo159See Klavine v. Hair, 331 N.E.2d 355 (Il. App. Ct. 1975) (evidence that plaintiff glanced into the glove compartment moments prior to the accident was
inadmissible).
-s 568 N.E.2d at 51.
1 768 F. Supp. 751 (D. Or. 1991).
162
163

Id. at 754.
Id. at 755.

'64 Western Helicopter Services, Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 777 F. Supp.
1543 (D. Or. 1991).
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vant must show that the evidence: (1) existed at the time
of the summary judgment, (2) could not have been discovered through due diligence, and (3) was of such magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to
change the disposition of the case. 65 The court held the
first factor was satisfied because the forks did in fact exist
at the time the motion was filed. The court held the second factor was also satisfied despite the defendant's assertion that the plaintiffs could have been more dogged in
pursuing examination of the forks. The court held that
the record reflected the plaintiffs' diligent pursuit of that
and other discovery. The court noted that a better course
of action would have been to file immediately a motion for
leave to file a supplemental memorandum in opposition
to the motion for summary judgment. The third factor
was satisfied because if the jury reasonably believed the
testimony of plaintiffs' expert, then it could reasonably
1 66
find that defendant manufactured the accident fork.
In Gerhard v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 16 7 the plaintiff alleged that the helicopter he was piloting crashed because
of a defectively manufactured bell crank. The court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment for a
variety of reasons. First, the plaintiffs were unable to produce metallurgical testimony to support their claim, and
the inability of their expert witness to conclude that the
bell crank was unsound did not raise a genuine issue of
material fact.' 68 Second, although the NTSB's conclusion
that the accident was probably caused by a defect was consistent with the plaintiff's theory, NTSB's conclusions regarding the probable cause of a crash were not admissible
as evidence in a subsequent civil action arising out of the
crash. 169 Third, the affidavit of plaintiff's mechanical engineering expert was conclusory and lacked specific
165

Id. at 1545 (citations omitted).

16 Id. at 1546.
167

68
.69

759 F. Supp. 552 (D. Minn. 1991).
Id. at 555.
49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1988).
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analysis. 170
F.

PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE

In Fine v. Facet Aerospace Products Co. ,171 the court held
that a products liability plaintiff who raises a design defect
claim is entitled to broader discovery than if the claim
were solely one of negligent manufacture.1 72 In Fine, the
plaintiff alleged that a defective fuel system caused the
crash in which he was injured. Fine sought discovery of
numerous aircraft fuel systems. The manufacturer produced documents specifically relating to metal fuel tanks
or protruding vented fuel tanks like those installed in the
crashed aircraft, but argued discovery of other types of
systems was irrelevant. The court noted that under New
York law a plaintiff bears the burden of proving feasible
design alternatives that would have rendered the product
safer.' 7 3 The requested discovery was relevant, therefore,
to prove feasible alternatives. The court, however, still
denied Fine's discovery request because he had not specifically alleged the other fuel systems would be safer.
Had Fine made a threshold showing of relevance, for example, through the affidavit of an expert in aviation engineering, presumably, discovery would have been
74
allowed.
In In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City,' 7 5 the court
granted the defendants' motion for a protective order
prohibiting the plaintiffs from taking depositions of its pilots in, or adjacent to, a flight simulator.' 7 6 The court
noted that the flight recorder provided direct evidence of
the events of the actual flight, and plaintiffs could question crew members about the flight. Conversely, the simulator required programming before it could simulate the
170Gerhard,

759 F. Supp. at 556.
133 F.R.D. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
172 Id. at 442.
173 Id at 443.
174 Id. at 129.
17. 131 F.R.D. 127 (N.D. Il. 1990).
176 Id.
17
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flight. The court held that although conducting the deposition while the crew members operated the flight simulator may have7 "theatrical value," it was burdensome and
17
oppressive.
In Thomas Brooks Charteredv. Burnett, 7 8 the Tenth Circuit
held that the NTSB could invite manufacturers of a plane
and its component parts to participate in an NTSB investigation without also allowing a representative of the individual who was killed in the crash to participate as an
observer.' 79 The court noted that whether parties are
named to participate in the investigation is left to the discretion of the investigator-in-charge.' 8 0 When they are
picked, they are identified according to "who can provide
suitable qualified technical personnel to actively assist in
the field investigation."' 8' The court added: "An NTSB
investigation is a forum for developing safety recommendations. It is not a show for an audience of silent note
takers looking for someone to sue."' 8 2 Because the NTSB
included in the record its reasons for denying participation,' 8 3 the court held that the decision was not arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of 8discretion,
or otherwise not in ac4
cordance with the law.'
177Id.

at 128.
920 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1990).
179 Id. at 636.
'so Id.
181 Id. at 637 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a) (1991)).
-82 Id. at 646.
"'3 The trial court noted that having a representative of the aircraft owner present would impede the free flow of information between the NTSB and the manufacturer. Also, the court noted that if representation was allowed at the main
investigation site, the investigation might be delayed because the same people
might demand representation at remote test sites. Finally, the court noted that
the NTSB factual reports were available to the aircraft owner, and that the investigators could be deposed. Id. at 640.
184 Id. at 647-48.
178
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FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (FTCA)
A.

DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION

In Tiffany v. United States,' 85 the Fourth Circuit held that
a claim which challenged military defense procedures in
intercepting an unidentified aircraft in restricted airspace
was not justiciable because it would violate the separation
of powers doctrine. 86 The plaintiffs' decedents were
killed in a mid-air collision between their Beech Baron airplane and a United States F-4C fighterjet. The decedent,
flying without a flight plan, entered an Air Defense Identification Zone as an unidentified and potentially hostile aircraft. Military authorities dispatched two fighter jets to
visually identify the unknown plane, and the collision occurred in poor weather conditions when one of the jets
instituted a sharp left bank to avoid the Baron. Tiffany's
widow brought suit under the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA) 18 7 and Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA)t 8s alleging
that the military pilot and ground control had been negligent in their conduct of the intercept.
The court noted that respect for separation-of-powers
principles addressed through the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA had been applied by analogy to
suits brought under DOHSA and SAA. ts 9 The court emphasized that the legislative and executive branches are
vested with exclusive authority to make discretionary decisions regarding issues of actual military defense. The
court held that it was not for the judiciary to challenge the
legality, wisdom or propriety of military tactics.1 90 The
court also held that the propriety of regulations which address intercept procedures were not for resolution by the
courts, but rather were best left to other branches of government with greater expertise and more direct political
-s' 931 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 867 (1992).
Id. at 282.
187 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1988).
18846 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1988).
189 Tiffany, 931 F.2d at 276 (citations omitted).
- Id. at 279.
186
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accountability.'' Consequently, the court reversed the
9 2
lower court and remanded with directions to dismiss.1
In Redmon By And Through Redmon v. United States, l93 the
Tenth Circuit held that the Federal Aviation Administration's decision to allow single-engine instrument flight
rules (IFR) rated pilots to carry over their IFR rating to a
multiengine rating without a practical flight test fell
squarely within the discretionary function exception.' 9 4
Likewise, after a rule change requiring a separate practical
test, the Administration's implementation of a grace period for pilots who had already commenced multiengine
training fit within the exception. 9 5 In Redmon, the pilot of
a private plane was killed when his plane crashed during a
thunderstorm. The plaintiffs alleged that the Administration negligently certified the pilot to fly multiengine aircraft in instrument flight conditions.
The court noted that 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a) empowered
the Secretary of Transportation "to issue airman certificates specifying the capacity in which the holders thereof
are authorized to serve as airmen."'' 9 6 Furthermore, the
Secretary was authorized to impose "such terms, conditions, and limitations as to ... periodic or special examinations . . . and other matters as the Secretary of
Transportation may determine to be necessary to assure
safety in air commerce."'' 9 7 The court held that the language clearly implied discretion on the part of the Secre98
tary to promulgate regulations and procedures.
Consequently, the court remanded with instructions to
enter summary judgment for the United States. 99
In Musick v. United States, 0 0 the court held that the dis19,

Id.

Id. at 282.
19-934 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1991).
194 Id. at 1156.
"9s Id. at 1156-57.
196 Id.
,97 49 U.S.C. app. § 1422(b)(1) (Supp. 1991).
198 934 F.2d at 1156.
192

-9 Id. at 1157.
200 768 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Va. 1991).
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cretionary function exception to the FTCA 20 ' did not preclude the United States from liability for the act of an Air
Force pilot who flew his RF-4 aircraft within 300 feet of
the ground causing a tree limb to fall and strike a timber
cutter.20 2 Although prevailing military regulations limited
pilots to an altitude no lower than 100 feet above ground
level (AGL), a squadron policy in effect at the time of the
accident limited pilots to an altitude of no lower than 300
feet AGL. The evidence showed that the limb in question
could only have been separated from the tree if the RF-4
had been flying below 300 feet AGL.
The court distinguished Tiffany v. United States203 on the
ground that Tiffany involved a "real world/real time military mission," whereas the present case involved a training mission. 0 4 In Musick, the court noted that the
squadron policy established an "envelope" in which the
pilot exercised judgment and discretion. Since the pilot
reached the margins of the envelope, he lost this discretionary role.20 5 The court then held that the government
was negligent per se noting that the pilot was in control of
a high performance aircraft and that unless he used due
care, it was foreseeable that the plane would cause injury
to persons on the ground.2 0 Therefore, the conduct
causing the injury fell within the scope of a Virginia statute criminalizing the operation of an aircraft without due
caution and in a manner endangering any person or
property.20 7
In Foster v. United States, 208 the court held that the decision of the Federal Air Surgeon to grant a "special issuance" medical certificate clearly qualified for protection
under the discretionary conduct exception to the

206

28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (West 1965 & Supp. 1991).
Musick, 768 F. Supp. at 185.
931 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 867 (1992).
Musick, 768 F. Supp. at 185.
Id. at 187.
Id.

207

Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 5.1-13 (Michie 1988)).

200

923 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991).

20,
202
203
204
205
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FTCA.2 °9 Consequently, the plaintiff's FTCA claim was
barred.
B.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

In In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport,210 the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs had failed to cite evidence
in support of their contention that two findings of the district judge were clearly erroneous.2 1' The plaintiffs
brought suit for death and injuries sustained when Delta
Flight 191 crashed after encountering an unusually strong
wind shear while attempting to land. The plaintiffs first
claimed that the trial judge erred in finding that the air
traffic controllers were not negligent in failing to route
Flight 191 to a different runway. The Fifth Circuit rejected this contention as a matter of law. The court noted
that under federal law, the final decision whether to land
rests with the captain of Flight 191, not the controllers. 1 2
The plaintiffs also claimed that the trial judge correctly
found that the air traffic controllers were negligent in not
relaying weather information to Flight 191, but erred in
finding that their negligence did not proximately cause
the crash. The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' request
for de novo review of this issue. The court held that de novo
review was inappropriate because a court's ultimate determination of proximate cause is a finding of fact and is reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard.21 3 The
court affirmed because under Texas law, the evidence
supported the finding that the crew's deliberate decision
to land the airplane, when the airplane easily could have
avoided windshear, was the sole proximate cause of the
crash.21 4
209

Id. at 768.

919 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom., Connors v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 276 (1991).
210

Id. at 1088.
Id. at 1084. "The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for,
and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft." F.A.R. 91.3(a).
213 Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 919 F.2d at 1085.
214 Id. at 1088.
211
212
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In Nakajima v. United States,2" 5 the court held that an air
traffic controller was negligent in failing to monitor and
issue traffic advisories warning aircrafts operating in the
area that a Cessna 152 was cleared for a fourth touch and
go landing, despite the fact that the controller had issued
traffic information to the aircraft during the previous
touch and go landing.21 6 Nakajima was training in a Bell
47G helicopter and was holding in a normal pattern. The
Cessna performed a simulated "dead-stick" emergency
landing procedure and descended into the helicopter's
main rotor. The helicopter crashed to the ground, killing
Nakajima; the Cessna landed without injury to its
occupants.
The court held that the controller was negligent in both
failing to advise the two aircraft of each other's position
and in failing to ensure that the respective pilots had each
other in sight.2 1 7 The court also found the controller negligent in failing to remain vigilant during the 107 second
period between the clearance for the fourth touch and go
and the collision. The controller's failure to properly
scan and observe the airport traffic pattern proximately
caused the controller's failure to issue the safety alerts.
The United States asserted an affirmative defense of
comparative negligence on the ground that Nakajima's
failure to "see and avoid" the Cessna was a contributing
cause of the collision. The court determined Nakajima
28
30% at fault and the United States 70% at fault.
In Frutin v. Dryvit Systems, Inc.,29 the court rejected the
government's attempt to avoid liability for ATC negligence because no similar type of liability existed under
applicable state law. 22 0 The plaintiff was injured when an
allegedly negligent air traffic controller failed to issue a
travel advisory to a departing plane that collided with his
215
216
217
218
219
220

759 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
Id. at 1580-81.
Id. at 1579.
Id. at 1581.
760 F. Supp. 234 (D. Mass. 1991).
Id. at 237.
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aircraft. The court rejected the government's assertion
that it could not be held liable since Massachusetts law did
not require a private person to issue a traffic advisory or
an affirmative warning under similar circumstances.2 2 '
The court remarked that the United States Supreme
Court had already rejected the argument that the FTCA
imposes no liability for the performance of activities
which private persons do not perform.222 Additionally,
the court rejected the government's assertion that the
proper standard of liability was the good samaritan doctrine, instead holding "[n]egligence is the appropriate
standard of liability imposed on private
persons and the
2
United States by Massachusetts law."11
C.

MISCELLANEOUS

In Howell v United States,224 the Eleventh Circuit held
that an FAA inspector's failure to ground an airplane
which the inspector knew contained contaminated fuel
was not actionable under Georgia's good samaritan doctrine 225 because the plaintiffs had not relied on the FAA's
inspection. 2 6 In Howell, the inspector cancelled a scheduled check ride after he observed that the plane's fuel was
contaminated. The inspector took no further action and
the aircraft's owners placed the aircraft back in service despite knowledge of the condition. The plane crashed two
days later, killing seventeen people.
The passengers' representatives brought suit under the
FTCA alleging that the inspector should have taken further action, and the failure to do so breached a legal duty
to the passengers. The court held that the closest state
Id.
See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955) ("There is
nothing in the Tort Claims Act which shows that Congress intended to draw distinctions so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the
mind for adequate formulation.")
223 760 F. Supp. at 238.
224 932 F.2d 915 (11 th Cir. 1991).
225 Id. at 918 (Georgia has adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 324A).
226 Howell, 932 F.2d at 919.
221

222
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law analogous to plaintiffs' cause of action was Georgia's
good samaritan doctrine which had been applied in Georgia cases to evaluate the liability of private parties for negligent safety inspection.22 7 However, the court held that
the good samaritan doctrine was not satisfied because the
inspector's conduct did not cause a nonhazardous condition to become more hazardous, thereby increasing the
risk of harm. 2 28 Furthermore, the FAA inspector did not
undertake to perform a duty owed by the airline to its passengers because "[t]he duties of the FAA supplement
rather than supplant the duties of the airline - duties
229
which the airline could not, and did not, delegate.
The court noted that the plaintiffs might have established
good samaritan liability by proving reliance on the inspection. However, the court held nothing, including public
knowledge that the FAA periodically inspects planes, established that the passengers had actual knowledge of the
unplanned FAA "inspection" two days before their
flight.2 30 Therefore, they could not and did not rely on it.
IV.

PREEMPTION

Courts have continued to address the circumstances determining when the Federal Aviation Act (the Act)
preempts state law. In West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. ,231 for
example, the court held that the Act preempted the plaintiff's state law claim for punitive damages.232 The plaintiff
brought a claim for compensatory and punitive damages
for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
arising from Northwest's refusal to allow the plaintiff to
board an overbooked flight. The court held that while the
plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages was not pre227 See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Smith, 322 S.E.2d 269 (Ga.
1984); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Clark, 267 S.E.2d 797 (Ga. 1980).
228 Howell, 932 F.2d at 919.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3852) (U.S. June 22,
1992) (No. 91-505)).
232 West, 923 F.2d at 659-60.
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empted by the Act, the claim for punitive damages was.23
The court also noted that federal airline overbooking regulations specifically contemplate customers choosing between either liquidated damages or state common law
remedies. 23 4 Therefore, "federal regulations contemplate
overbooking as an acceptable practice so long as passengers receive compensation. Accordingly, any scheme that
punishes the practice
would be inconsistent with applicable
235
federal law.
In Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc. ,236 however, the
court found Hawaii state law crashworthiness claims were
neither impliedly preempted by the Act,237 nor conflicted
with federal regulation. 3 8 In Holliday, the plaintiffs
brought a products liability action for injuries incurred
when their helicopter lost power shortly after takeoff and
plunged to the ground. The plaintiffs asserted that the
pilot's seat and seat belt were designed defectively, enhancing their injuries and giving rise to a crashworthiness
claim. The defendant first argued that the crashworthiness claim was impliedly preempted by the Act. The court
rejected this argument, reasoning that the defendants
were unable to show that Congress intended to occupy
the specific field of products liability. 239 Furthermore, the
court noted that section 1506 of the Act was a savings
clause 240 which expressly precluded such congressional
intent. 4
The defendant also asserted that federal regulations of
aircraft design, maintenance, and operation were so comprehensive that they provided the exclusive standard for
measuring design defects. The defendant argued that the
Id. at 661.
14 C.F.R. § 250.9(b) (1990).
235 West, 923 F.2d at 661.
236 747 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Haw. 1990).
237 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1542 (1988).
238 Holliday, 747 F. Supp. at 1400.
239 Id.; see West v. Northwest Airlines, 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1990).
240 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988).
24,Holliday, 747 F. Supp. at 1398.
233

234
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plaintiffs' claim should be preempted because the defendant had met the minimum Federal Aviation Administration standards for aircraft seats and safety belts. 42 The
defendant analogized the case to those holdings that the
243
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA)
specifically preempted crashworthiness claims against car
manufacturers for failure to provide an air bag as standard equipment. The court was unpersuaded, as it noted
that the MVSA contained an explicit preemption
clause, 24424 whereas the Federal Aviation Act did not.245
Furthermore, unlike the Federal Aviation Act, the MVSA
empowered car manufacturers to choose among various
options.2 4 6 The MVSA impliedly preempted state law
claims because such claims would effectively prohibit the
exercise of that federally granted option.2 4 7 Because the
Federal Aviation Act did not provide such an option, the
plaintiff's crashworthiness claim was not preempted.
The court also held that the crashworthiness claim was
not preempted by conflict preemption because compliance with both state and federal law was possible.2 4a The
court noted that although the federal law set forth minimum standards, "nothing in the [Federal Aviation Act] indicates that states may not require aircraft to be more safe
or better designed. 2 49 Furthermore, the court held that
"aircraft manufacturers should not be insulated from liability for a defectively designed product by their compliance with certain minimum standards. 250 Consequently,
the defendants' claims were not preempted.
One court also held that state trucking regulations may
be preempted by federal law. In Federal Express Corp. v.
242 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 27.1413, 27.785, 27.1307, 27.1301, 27.561 (1983).
243 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988).
244 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988).
245 Holliday, 747 F. Supp. at 1400.
246 See 15 U.S.C. § 1410b (1988) (manufacturers may choose between

seat belts or passive restraints).
247 Holliday, 747 F. Supp. at 1400.
248 Id. at 1401.
249

Id.

250

Id.
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California Public Utilities Commission,251 the Ninth Circuit
held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978252 preempted state Public Utility Commission (PUC) regulatrucking
Express'
Federal
affected
that
tions
operations. 253 Federal Express brought the action seeking to enjoin the California PUC from imposing regulations that governed the imposition, suspension and public
inspection of tariffs of common carriers, and that governed the bills of lading, freight bills and other documents issued by the carriers.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court and held
that the PUC was impermissibly acting in an area of economic regulation.2 5 ' The court found that "[t]he trucking
operations of Federal Express [were] integral to its operation as an air carrier. ' 255 The court stated
Federal Express is exactly the kind of an expedited allcargo service that Congress specified and the kind of integrated transportation system that was federally desired.
Because it is an integrated system, it is a hybrid, an air
carrier employing trucks. Those trucks do not destroy its
status as an air carrier.256
V.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

A.

CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY

In Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. United States,2 57 the court
held that the exclusive remedy of Alaska's Worker's Com936 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.denied, 112 S. Ct. 2956 (1992).
25249 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988). The Act provides as follows:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no State or
political subdivision thereof ... shall enact or enforce any law, rule,
251

regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect
of law relating to rates, routes or services of any air carrier having
authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to provide air

transportation.
Id. § 1305(a)(1).

Corp., 936 F.2d at 1078-79.
Id.
255 Id. at 1078.
256 Id. at 1079.
257 755 F. Supp. 269 (D. Alaska 1990).
253 Federal Express
254
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pensation Act (AWCA) 258 precluded recognition of a third
party's right to implied contractual or noncontractual indemnity against the employer of the injured employee. 59
The suit arose when a helicopter piloted by an officer of
the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) crashed near Port Hardy, British Columbia. The crash occurred during the pilot's attempt to land
after running out of fuel. A passenger who was a civilian
employee of NOAA and the pilot were both seriously injured. The injured parties settled with the manufacturer
and seller of the helicopter (Bell). Subsequently, Bell
sued the government for indemnity or contribution pursuant to the FTCA.
The court noted that Alaska law requires three conditions to be met before a right of non-contractual indemnity can be established: (1) the indemnitee (Bell) must
have discharged a legal obligation, such as a tort liability
to a third party; (2) the indemnitor (the government) must
be liable for the same obligation to the third party; and (3)
the obligation ought to be discharged by the indemnitor
rather than the indemnitee.2 60 The court held that the
second prong was not satisfied because the exclusive remedy provision of AWCA precluded a finding that the government was liable in tort. 26 ' Furthermore, the third
prong was not satisfied because Alaska law would hold
that Bell, rather than the government, ought to discharge
Bell's obligation to the injured passenger. 6 2 Therefore,
the court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment. 26 3 The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the
258 ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1990); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines,
Inc., 343 F. Supp. 826, 828-29 (D. Alaska 1972).

259 755 F. Supp. at 273.
260 Id. at 274; see Industry Risk Insurers v. Creole Prod. Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp

1323, 1328 (D. Alaska 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1984).
261

755 F. Supp. at 274.

262

Id.

263 Id. at 275. The court would have held that the AWCA did not preclude an
action by a third party for indemnity from the employer of an employee injured in
part by the actions of the third party based upon an express contract to indemnify.
However, no claim of express indemnity was raised. Id. at 273-74.
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lower court's decision. 26
B.

ISSUE PRECLUSION

In In re Air Crash at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Detroit,
Michigan on August 16, 1987,265 the court held that the
plaintiffs in a mass tort litigation who had elected not to
become parties to the underlying joint liability trial were
permitted to apply the doctrine of offensive issue preclusion and obtain a finding of liability against the carrier.266
The litigation arose when a McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) DC-9 aircraft, operated by Northwest Airlines, Inc., (Northwest) crashed on take-off when it did not
attain a sufficient altitude to avoid hitting a light pole.
One hundred and fifty-six people died in the accident, including passengers and bystanders on the ground below.
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred
all cases arising out of the crash to the Eastern District of
Michigan for consolidated pretrial proceedings and ultimately the last of the participating plaintiffs accepted
MDC's offer of settlement. Subsequently, a jury found
Northwest liable for the accident and required it to indemnify MDC for its losses. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs who had not participated in the prior proceeding
brought suit and sought to apply the finding of liability to
their respective cases. Northwest objected on the ground
that the plaintiffs were barred from the use of collateral
estoppel.
Northwest cited Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 26 7 for the
proposition that since a federal court sitting in diversity
applies state substantive law to the merits of the action, a
federal diversity judgment is nothing more than a statecourt judgment, the preclusive effect of which should be
determined by state law. 6 ' Northwest contended that
264 Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc. v. U.S., No. 91-35324, 91-35338, 1992 WL
127830 (9th Cir. June 15, 1992).
265 776 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Mich. 1991).

267

Id. at 317.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).

26-

Air Crash at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 776 F. Supp. at 320.

26
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Michigan requires mutuality and, because the plaintiffs
were not parties to the earlier trial, mutuality was lacking.
However, the court held that a mechanical application of
the Erie doctrine was improper and that federal law
should prevail.269
As an initial matter, the court noted that the jury had
also determined issues that were governed by federal
law; 2 70 therefore, the defendants' characterization that the
matter involved solely state substantive issues was inaccurate. 27' The court then held that the federal law of issue
preclusion was applicable for three policy reasons. First,
a federal court is duty bound to protect its own judgment
regardless of the substantive issues involved. 72 Second,
preclusion concepts may relate to procedural interests of
the court, rather than the substantive law. Third, fairness
and efficiency should permit a court to determine the
scope of its own judgments. In light of these reasons, the
court applied the federal law of issue preclusion to the
matter.
Northwest contended that even under federal law the
United States Supreme Court had explicitly stated in ParkLane Hosiery Co. v. Shore273 that offensive issue preclusion
may not be applied in mass tort litigation. However, the
court stated: "A close reading of ParkLane Hosiery reveals
that the Court (1) authorized the use of offensive collateral estoppel, and (2) only mentioned, but did not broadly accept, the arguments that have been advanced against the wholesale
application of offensive collateral estoppel.' '2 74 The court
agreed that the doctrine should not be applied in situations where the result would be unfair to the defendant.
However, the court held that "[t]he contours of when ofId. at 321.
Id. ("For example, the issue of willful and wanton misconduct was governed
by the Warsaw Convention.") Id. at 321, n.l 1.
271 Id.
272 Id. (citing CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4472, at 733 (1982)).
269
270

273
274

439 U.S. 322, 330 n.14 (1979).
776 F. Supp. at 325.
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fensive collateral estoppel would be unfair - even in
mass tort litigation - should be developed on a case-bycase basis. Invoking the term 'mass tort litigation' is
meaningless without contextual analysis. '"275
The court then held that application of the doctrine
would not be unfair in the instant case. 76 The court rejected Northwest's contention that plaintiffs were "wait
and see" plaintiffs who had benefitted from the efforts of
MDC, but avoided exposure to the risks of an adverse verdict. The court noted that plaintiffs' options in the prior
case were: (1) settling, (2) severing, or (3) stipulating not
to contest liability in exchange for a damages only trial. 77
However, the plaintiffs' options had not included the right
to proceed to trial and judgment against Northwest.
The court also rejected Northwest's contention that it
would be denied procedural opportunities unavailable in
the first action that would cause a different result in a second trial. Northwest asserted it could have conducted
more discovery and called different witnesses. However,
the court held that was true of every case and "like life,
litigation must end at some point. ' 278 The court noted
that the first trial had attained monolithic proportions and
that Northwest's claims of lack of discovery and inability
to call witnesses were wholly unfounded.
C.

MANDAMUS

In TransportesAeros Nacionales, S.A. v. Downey, 279 a Texas
court of appeals refused to issue a writ of mandamus directing a judge to withdraw a choice-of-law order because
the moving party failed to demonstrate the judge's order
was a clear abuse of discretion and there was no adequate
remedy by way of appeal.2 8 0 The underlying action in275
276

277
278
279

Id.
Id.

Id. at 319.
Id. at 325.
817 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding

[leave denied]).
280

Id. at 395.
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volved a Continental Airlines airplane, leased to and operated by Transportes Aeros Nacionales, S.A. The
airplane was en route to Miami, Florida, from San Jose,
Costa Rica, and crashed while approaching an intermediate stop at Tegucigalpa, Honduras. The injured passengers and representatives of the deceased passengers
brought actions under Texas law for negligence, gross
negligence and strict products liability. The trial court
held that Texas law would govern the issues of punitive
damages, negligent inspection or maintenance, and products liability, and the law of Honduras would govern the
issues of negligent operation of the aircraft.
Continental filed a writ of mandamus asserting that the
trial judge abused his discretion in failing to presume that
Honduras law would apply to all issues in the case. Continental argued that the "most significant relationship" test
mandated application of Honduras law because both the
accident and the conduct causing the accident occurred in
Honduras. However, the court of appeals rejected Continental's argument because Continental failed to demonstrate the need for an extraordinary remedy. The court
held that the trial judge's ruling was incidental and that an
adequate remedy existed by way of appeal.2 8 ' Furthermore, the court held that Continental had also failed to
demonstrate that the judge's order was a clear abuse of
discretion.2 82
D. ARBITRATION
In Vintage Aircraft International,Inc. v. Specialty Restaurants
Corp.,28s the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, refused to hold a party in contempt for failing to
comply with the exact terms of an arbitration agreement.
As part of the dissolution of a business venture, Vintage
Aircraft Int'l., Inc. (Vintage) was required to transfer a
two seater Hawker Sea Fury to Specialty Restaurants Cor281
282
283

Id.
Id.
576 N.Y.S.2d 296 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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poration's (Specialty). Vintage appealed the award; however, during the pendency of Vintage's appeal, the
airplane was destroyed by fire. The order from the court
below was affirmed and Specialty moved to punish Vintage for contempt for its failure to transfer the plane and
for a money judgment for the value of the airplane. The
trial court denied the motion, and Specialty appealed.
The court noted that neither the arbitration award, nor
the order and judgment confirming it, made provision for
the monetary equivalent of the airplane in the event the
airplane was not produced.284 The court held that in order to recover the monetary equivalent or the insurance
proceeds, Specialty was required to file a motion to vacate
or amend the order and judgment confirming the
award.285
VI.
A.

AIRPORTS

PREMISES LIABILITY

In Gross v. American Airlines, Inc. ,286 the court held a common carrier's duty of care was not so broad as to protect a
passenger injured as a result of attempting to assist a woman who had fallen backwards onto him while they were
waiting in line at American's check-in counter. 28 7 The
court held that the passenger had failed to link his injury
to any conduct on the part of the carrier because he had
not shown what caused the woman to fall. 28 8 Furthermore, the court held that passengers waiting to check-in
had a duty to look for obstacles, such as potentially misplaced bags, and to use reasonable care for their own
safety.2 8 9 Consequently, the court found that the plaintiff
failed to establish negligence and entered summary judg-

288

Id. at 297.
Id.
755 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Id. at 91.
Id.

289

Id.

284
285

286
287
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ment for the defendant.
In Jorgensen v. Massachusetts Port Authority,2 9 ' the court
held that two airline pilots could not recover for damage
to their reputations when their aircraft crashed due to the
negligence of the Massachusetts Port Authority. 292 Jorgensen arose as a result of the pilots involvement in an accident when their aircraft skidded off the end of an icy
Logan Airport runway and plunged partially into the Boston Harbor, killing two people. The accident was allegedly caused by the negligence of the Port Authority in
failing to keep the runway free of ice. The court agreed
that Massachusetts might recognize a claim for negligent
damage to reputation.293 However, the court did not
need to resolve that issue because the plaintiffs failed to
present evidence of specific lost job opportunities. As a
result of that omission, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's award of damages
for lost earning capacity stemming from injury to reputation.294 Similarly, there was insufficient evidence to support an award for emotional distress resulting from the
alleged loss of earning capacity.295
296
In Gaines v. Huntsville-Madison County Airport Authority,
the Alabama Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a statutory provision which accorded larger airport
authorities immunity from all actions in tort but smaller
airport authorities immunity only from negligence. 97
The plaintiff, who slipped and fell on a flight of stairs at
the Huntsville-International Carl T. Jones Airport, sued
the Airport Authority alleging both simple negligence and
wanton negligence. The court dismissed the action beId.
905 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1990).
22 Id. at 521-22.
293 Id.
-: Id. at 526.
295 Id.
296 581 So. 2d 444 (Ala. 1991).
297 Id. at 445.
290

291
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cause it found the Authority was immune from suit. 2 98

The plaintiff alleged the statutory immunity provision created unconstitutional classifications and asserted that had
he been injured at a smaller airport, he could have recovered for willful negligence of an airport employee;
whereas at a larger airport, he could not. Because no suspect classification was implicated, the court employed the
lowest level of scrutiny to analyze the constitutionality of
the provision. 2 99 Even then, there was no rational basis

for the distinction. Consequently, the court struck the
portion of the act that provided immunity as to torts other
than negligence, and reversed and remanded on the issue
3 00
of wantonness.
B.

FREE SPEECH

In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 3° ' the United States Supreme Court held that an airport terminal was a non-public forum and an airport authority could promulgate reasonable regulations
prohibiting the in-person solicitation of funds. 0 2 The International Society for Krishna Conciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) brought an action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief setting aside various regulations promulgated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
(Port Authority). The regulations banned both the distribution of literature and in-person soliciation of funds.
ISKCON asserted that the regulations violated the First
Amendment because airport terminals were traditional
public fora for expressive activity. The Court followed a
"forum based" approach for assessing restrictions that
the government sought to place on the use of its property. 3 This approach divides government property into
Id.
Id. at 448.
3-0 id. at 448-49.
-0160 U.S.L.W. 4749 (U.S. June 26, 1992) (No. 91-155).
302 Id. at 4753.
o10See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
800 (1985).
298

2-
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three categories: government property that has traditionally been available for public expression, public property
which is designated as a public forum, and all remaining
public property. Government regulations restraining expressive activity conducted on the last category of property need only satisfy a reasonableness standard. 0 4
The Court held that airport terminals were neither a
traditional, nor a designated public forum. 3 0 5 Thus, terminals fell in the third category of property and were not
public fora. The Court also held that Port Authority's ban
on solicitation survived the "reasonableness" review because the solicitation might have a disruptive effect on airport business and the solicitor might cause duress by
targeting vulnerable persons or by committing fraud by
concealing his affiliation. 0 6 The Court noted that the
Port Authority could reasonably worry that the incremental effects of having one group and then another seek such
access could prove quite disruptive even if the inconvenience
caused
by
the
petitioner
might
seem
inconsequential. 0 7
In the related decision of Lee v. International Society of
Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,308 the Supreme Court held that
the ban on distribution of literature by the Port Authority
was invalid under the First Amendment.3 0 9 Four of the
five Justices who affirmed the judgment based their decision on the ground that an airport terminal was a public
forum. The Justices held that the ban failed to satisfy the
requirements of narrow tailoring to further a significant
state interest and availability of ample alternative channels for communication.3 1 0 Another Justice reached the
conclusion on the ground that an airport terminal was not
a public forum but the ban on distribution of literature
3- Lee, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4751.
305 Id.
s06 Id. at
307

4752.
Id. at 4752-53.

08 60 U.S.L.W. 4761 (U.S. June 26, 1992) (No. 91-339).
-9 Id.
310

Id.
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failed to satisfy the reasonableness standard.3 1 ' The four
dissenting Justices remarked that the distribution ban was
as reasonable as the solicitation ban in a non-public forum
and that it should be upheld. 12
C.

NUISANCE

313
In County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, Connecticut,
the court dismissed federal claims by a county of one state
brought against another state, but refused to dismiss the
county's common-law claims. The plaintiff, Westchester
County Airport (WCA), located in New York, desired to
top trees located in adjacent Greenwich, Connecticut,
which encumbered the clear zone of a runway. 4 The fact
that the trees were located in Connecticut led to the litigation because New York could not exercise its powers of
eminent domain over property located in another state.
The court first held that the plaintiff was a citizen of
New York for Eleventh Amendment purposes.3 5 Consequently, any relief based on Connecticut state law was
barred for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court
also rejected the plaintiff's assertion that it was entitled to
freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of the
United States.3 16 The court held "nothing in the statute
...suggests that Congress meant to create a private
right
31 7
airport.
an
of
owner
the
of
favor
in
action
of
However, the court refused to dismiss the plaintiff's
3, Id. at 4761.
Id.

312

313745 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
314 A clear zone is established by the FAA and requires a specified amount of
unencumbered airspace for airplanes to take off and land. See 14 C.F.R. § 77.25
(1990). The FAA reduced the usable length of Runway 11/29 from approximately 4,450 feet to 3,100 feet because the neighboring trees reduced the clear
zone.
315 County of Westchester, 745 F. Supp. at 955.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

316 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1304 (1982).
317

County of Westchester, 745 F. Supp. at 955.
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claim of common-law nuisance. 3 "1 The court held that
whether or not growing trees was a reasonable use of the
property in the particular locality under the circumstances
involved a "balancing of the competing interests of the
parties and ...must ultimately be resolved by the trier of
fact."'3' 9 Furthermore, the court refused to dismiss the
plaintiff's claim that it had acquired a prescriptive easement in the airspace above the defendant's property. 20
In Oakley v. Simmons, 32 l the Tennessee Court of Appeals
reinstated a jury award of punitive damages, despite no
award of compensatory damages, because the trial judge
had awarded injunctive relief.322 In Oakley, the plaintiff
maintained a private airstrip on his property. The defendant neighbor erected a forty foot pole directly in the
path of Oakley's north/south runway. The defendant
stated that the pole would be used as a light pole, but the
pole was located 360 feet from the residence and 400 feet
from the road. The defendant also indicated he intended
to plant two fifty foot trees on either side of the pole. The
plaintiff brought suit alleging the pole was a nuisance. At
trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff $5000 punitive damages
but no compensatory damages. The judge set aside the
award but ordered the neighbor to remove the pole. Both
parties appealed. The court of appeals held that the defendant's pole created a nuisance because it disturbed the
free use of Oakley's property. 23 The court also upheld
the award of punitive damages. The court agreed that actual damages must be sustained in order to sustain an
award of punitive damages.3 24 The court held, however,
where the plaintiff has proved an entitlement to injunctive
relief, an award of punitive damages may be upheld even
318 Id.
319 Id.

at 959.

320Id.

S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 672.
323Id. at 671.
324 Id. at 671; see Emerson v. Garner, 732 S.W.2d 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
M2 799

322
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without an award of compensatory damages.3 25
D.

NoiSE ABATEMENT

In Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizensfor
the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,326 the United States
Supreme Court held that an act of Congress authorizing
the transfer of operating control of two major airports
from the federal government to the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) violated the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.3 2 7 The transfer
was fueled by a need to raise funds through tax-exempt
instruments for capital improvements. 32 The Transfer
Act 3 29 conditioned the transfer on the MWAA's creation
of a unique Board of Review (Board). The Board was
composed of nine congressional members and was vested
with the power to veto decisions made by MWAA's board
of directors. Essentially, the creation of the Board was intended to insure against the potential for decreases in
traffic from National Airport to Dulles Airport likely to result from the transfer of control. 330 The MWAA endeavored to overcome the separation-of-powers issue by
requiring the Board members to serve in their individual
capacities as representatives of users of the airports,
rather than as agents of Congress.
Subsequently, MWAA's Board of Directors adopted a
master plan to build a new terminal and increase capacity
at National. Suit was brought by a group of citizens, the
325

326

327

Oakley, 799 S.W.2d at 672.
111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
111 S. Ct. at 2312.

328 The Secretary of Transportation concluded that, given the need to limit federal expenditures, necessary capital improvements could not be financed for
either airport unless control of the airports was transferred to a regional authority
with power to raise money by selling tax-exempt bonds. Id. at 2302; see S. REP.
No. 99-193, p. 2 (1985).
329 Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3341, 49 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2451-2461 (1988) [hereinafter Transfer Act].
130 It was feared that flights to National would be rerouted to Dulles. Since
National was favored by government employees, a decrease in flight availability
would have been inconvenient.
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Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. (CAAN)
who resided under the flight paths at National. CAAN
sought a declaration that the Board's veto power was unconstitutional and asked the court to enjoin any actions
taken by MWAA which were subject to a potential veto.
The effect of CAAN's proposed declaration would cripple
the MWAA and prevent the implementation of the Transfer Act.
The Court rejected MWAA's contention that the creation of the Board did not present a constitutional issue.
The Court held:
We thus confront an entity created at the initiative of Congress, the powers of which Congress has delineated, the
purpose of which is to protect an acknowledged federal
interest, and membership in which is restricted to congressional officials. Such an entity necessarily exercises
sufficient federal power as an agent of Congress to mandate separation-of-powers scrutiny.33 '
The court expressed concern that "Congress could, if this
Board of Review were valid, use similar expedients to enable its Members or agents to retain control, outside the
ordinary legislative process, of the activities of state grant
recipients charged with executing virtually every aspect of
national policy. ' 332 Therefore, the Court held the Transfer Act was unconstitutional. s
E.

AUTO RENTAL CONCESSIONS

In Epps Aircraft Inc. v. Montgomery Airport Authority,33 4 the
Alabama Supreme Court held that an airport authority
resolution violated the Alabama Constitution because it
impaired the obligation of contracts. 35 In Epps, Exxon
was authorized under the terms of its primary lease to act
as a Fixed Base Operator (FBO) and to provide "[s]uch
331Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 111 S. Ct. at 2308.
332 Id. at 2312.
33 Id.
33

570 So. 2d 625 (Ala. 1990).

$35

Id. at 629.
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other services ... and rental of such other items as from
33 6
time to time may be handled by FBO's generally.
Epps Aircraft Inc. (Epps) entered into a lease with Exxon
to operate a Thrifty Car Rental business. Exxon's lease
with the airport required Exxon to pay fees of no more
than four percent of gross income. As a sublessee, Epps'
fee schedule was the same as Exxon's. In contrast, Airport Authority regulations required that automobile
rental businesses who obtained their concessions directly
from the airport were charged ten percent of gross sales.
Subsequently, the airport approved a resolution which
compelled "non-tenant rental car businesses" (a term
which by definition included Epps' business) to directly
pay the airport ten percent of gross income.
Epps brought suit challenging the constitutionality of
the resolution. The court held automobile rental services
fell within the lease category of "[s]uch other services...
and rental of such other items as from time to time may be
handled by Fixed Base Operators generally. 3'1 3 To hold
otherwise would be to allow the Airport to avoid its contractual obligations under the primary lease, in violation
of article I, section 22, of the Alabama Constitution. Consequently, the resolution was inapplicable to Epps.
F.

LIMOUSINE SERVICES

In Pontarelli Limousine, Inc. v. City of Chicago,3 3 8 the Seventh Circuit held that a state court judgment which had
been vacated was not entitled to have a preclusive effect in
any future litigation. Furthermore, the court held that a
city regulation which prohibited city livery services from
using dispatcher booths at O'Hare Airport, but allowed
suburban services to use them, did not violate equal
protection. 3 9
The dispute originated twenty years earlier when the
336

Id. at 626.
630.

337 Id. at

929 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1991).
3.19
Id. at 341.
338

56

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[58

City of Chicago established a livery dispatch system in order to reduce traffic congestion caused by parked cabs
which blocked traffic as the drivers hawked for "walk up"
fares. The dispatch booths were used only for suburban
livery services since the principal demand for "walk up"
passengers was for service to the suburbs rather than the
city. Subsequently, two city-licensed livery services became affiliated with suburban livery services, leading to a
lawsuit in Illinois state court against the City of Chicago
by three city-licensed livery services. The livery services
won, but in exchange for additional consideration, agreed
with the City and the state court to vacate the judgment.
Pontarelli was a duplicative suit brought by ten city-licensed livery companies. In Pontarelli, a jury awarded
plaintiffs $400,000 in damages but the district judge entered judgment for defendants notwithstanding the verdict. 40 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the
district court did not err in refusing to give preclusive effect to the state court litigation. 3 41 ' The court held that
Illinois law deprived a vacated judgment of any future effect.342 Additionally, the court held that there was no denial of equal protection. 43 The court noted that the
regulation could only be struck down if it was irrational
because no suspect classification was implicated. The
court determined that the regulation was rationally related to alleviating the city's perceived traffic congestion
problem at the airport. Consequently, the district court
344
did not err in overturning the jury verdict.
A similar result was reached in American VI.P. Limousines
Inc. v. Dade County Board of County Commissioners.3 45 A
group of limousine operators brought an action challenging various regulations governing service to Miami International Airport. The district court held that the
340 735 F. Supp. 782, 786 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1991).
341 929 F.2d at 340.
143

Id.; see Matchett v. Rose, 649 N.E.2d 770, 779 (Il1. App. 1976).
929 F.2d at 341.

344

Id. at 343.

342

-4

- 757 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
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classifications neither violated the equal protection rights
of the limousine services nor did the regulations violate
the commerce clause. 46 The court did, however, hold a
pickup fee of ten dollars charged to limousine services
was discriminatory in view of the fact that taxicabs were
only required to pay one dollar.3 4 7
VII.

WARSAW CONVENTION AND AIR CARRIER
LIABILITY
A.

WARSAW JURISDICTION

In Alvarez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. ,348 the
court held that the Warsaw Convention 349 did not create
an exclusive cause of action and therefore did not authorize an action brought solely under state law to be removed
to federal court.3 5 0 In Alvarez, the plaintiff's decedents
died in the crash of Avianca Flight 52 while approaching
Kennedy Airport, New York, en route from Medellin, Colombia. The plaintiff filed her complaint in Florida state
court. The defendants asserted that the Warsaw Convention created an exclusive federal cause of action, however,
and thus removal to federal court was proper. The court
rejected the defendant's assertion and held that the Convention does not create an exclusive cause of action. The
court did agree, however, that the Convention creates an
exclusive remedy which limits the liability that can be imposed on carriers for claims brought under state law.35 '
Consequently, because the plaintiffs grounded the action
solely in Florida wrongful death law and did not invoke
any federal law or statute as a basis for her claim, the
court remanded the action for further proceedings in the
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
347 Dade County Board, 757 F. Supp. at 1399.
346

348 756 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Fla. 1991).

s9 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876 (1934), (reprintedfollowing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
350 756 F. Supp. at 555.
35l

Id.
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state court.352
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland,15 1 the
court held that for purposes of determining whether Warsaw jurisdiction was proper "the ultimate destination of
the passenger is the place where the passenger intended
to end up and would have ended up but for the accident". 54 Litigation arose from an airline crash in which
the plaintiff's decedents were killed. The defendant
LOT, the Polish national airline, asserted that because the
ultimate destination on the plaintiff's decedent's round
trip ticket was Warsaw, the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention. The plaintiffs asserted their decedents had
intended to remain in the United States and redeem the
unused portion of their tickets. The plaintiffs further
maintained that their decedents had only purchased
round trip tickets because they believed that Polish law
requiring the purchase of round trip tickets applied to
them, despite having United States permanent residency
status.
The court noted other decisions in which the "ultimate
destination" has been determined either by looking at the
destination listed on the contract, 55 or the place where
the mutual intentions of the parties determine the ultimate destination was if other than that listed on the contract.356 The court rejected both alternatives. The court
held that "[t]he intention of the passenger alone, and not
the mutual intention of the parties as expressed in the
contract or otherwise, determines the passenger's 'ultimate destination'.... [T]here should be a presumption
3'

id. at 556.

35- 760 F. Supp. 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
354Id.

at 32.

155See Gayda v. LOT Polish Airlines, 702 F.2d 424, 425 (2d Cir. 1983) ("it is the
'ultimate' destination listed in the contract that controls").
356 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Malaga, Spain, 577 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (Gayda does not preclude either the passenger or the carrier from showing
that certain terms in the purported contract arose from a mutual mistake).
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that the ticket indicates that destination. ' 57 Consequently, LOT's motion was denied with the provision that
it could renew the motion after taking discovery concerning the decedents' intentions.
B.

INJURIES WITHIN SCOPE OF CONVENTION

In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,ss8 the United States
Supreme Court interpreted Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention to exclude recovery for purely mental injuries. 59
In Floyd, an international flight originating in Miami experienced rapid loss of altitude resulting from the failure
of all three of the aircraft's engines. After descending
without power for a brief period the crew managed to
restart one engine and the plane returned safely to Miami.
A group of passengers, whose complaints were consolidated for trial, brought an action against Eastern claiming
damages solely for mental distress arising out of the incident. Reversing the decision of the court of appeals and
affirming the district court, the Supreme Court held that
the term "bodily injury" excludes recovery for purely
mental injuries.3 6 0 The court held: 1) the contemporary
plain meaning of "lesion corporelle" excludes non-physical injuries; 2) neither French legislative history nor decisional law indicates that, at the time the Warsaw
Convention was drafted, the term "lesion corporelle" included non-physical injuries; 3) the minutes of the drafters' committee meetings provided no evidence that the
drafters contemplated the existence of a psychic injury
unaccompanied by a physical injury; 4) protocols appearing to expand the meaning of "lesion corporelle" were
not supported by discussions that would incorporate
solely non-physical injuries; and 5) to follow the single sister signatory that expanded the term to include solely
157 Air Crash Disaster near Warsaw, Poland,
358 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991) (prior decision

remand to 937 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1991).
359 Floyd, 111 S. Ct. at 1497.
3- Id. at 1498.

760 F. Supp. at 32.
at 872 F.2d 1462 (11 th Cir. 1989), on

60

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[58

psychic injuries could subject international air carriers to
36
strict liability for purely mental distress. '
In contrast, the New York court in In re Inflight Explosion
on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft ApproachingAthens, Greece
on April 2, 1986,362 found damages for pain and extreme
psychic suffering were awardable under the Warsaw Convention.36 3 A known terrorist had boarded Flight 840 in
Cairo and had placed a bomb under her own seat. After
setting the bomb trigger and deplaning in Rome, she proceeded to a self-congratulatory television appearance in
Lebanon. As Flight 840 approached Athens Airport, the
bomb exploded, killing four passengers and injuring
others. Alberto Ospina, seated above the bomb, was
blown out of the plane; his broken body was later found
with serious wounds in the lower torso. A jury found
TWA's failure to maintain adequate security measures
constituted willful conduct and awarded Mr. Ospina's
widow $2,754,951.60 in damages. TWA asserted that the
Convention did not cover survival damages and argued
that the court had erred in permitting an included award
of $85,000 for Mr. Ospina's pain and suffering for being
blown out of the plane and falling to the ground.
The court held that federal common law, not state law,
resolved the issue of the Convention's coverage of damages in a survival action. 3 4 To fashion a uniform modern
federal common law rule for Warsaw Convention recoveries, the court looked to the policies underlying survival
actions, to state law decisions addressing the issue, and to
analogous federal statutes. The court noted survival actions are designed to ensure that a tortfeasor will not fare
better in court by killing than by injuring, due to the termination of subsequent damages for pain and suffering.
at 1493-94.
778 F. Supp. 625 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).

361 Id.
362

363 Id.

Id. at 640-41; see In re Aircrash at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 928
I3
F.2d 1267, 1274 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Rein v. Pan Am World Airways, 112 S. Ct.
331 (1991) (holding the Warsaw Convention preempts state law causes of action
and applying federal common law to determine substantive issues).
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The court was particularly persuaded that damages were
appropriate because of a person's inviolate right against
impairment of his or her freedom.3 65 The court also
noted that the majority of states have either survival statutes or provide for survival recovery under wrongful
death statutes.3 66 Furthermore, the court noted that several federal statutes provide for survival recovery, including damages for pain and suffering. 367 Consequently, the
court held that the damages included survival recovery for
the purpose of the Convention.3 6 Therefore, the court
affirmed the award.
In Padilla v. Olympic Airways, 6 9 the court held that an airline was not liable under the terms of the Convention for
a passenger's injuries where the passenger had deliberately consumed between seven and nine beers prior to
collapsing in the airplane lavatory.3 70 The court maintained that the plaintiff had not proven that he was injured
as the result of an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17. The plaintiff had failed to prove that the continued service of alcohol to him during the flight was an
unusual or unexpected event because there was no evidence that the airline was aware of his alleged
intoxication.3
C.

CARGO AND PASSENGER BAGGAGE

In Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, Inc. ,372 the Second Circuit held that article 18, section 3, of the Warsaw
Convention did not apply to the loss of cargo which had
been successfully transported to an air freight forwarder's
warehouse located outside the boundaries of the airport,
778 F. Supp. at 631.
Id.
367 Id. at 632-36.
365

366

368 Id.

369 765 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
370 Id. at 838.
371 Id. at 837 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405-06 (1985) (liability
arises under Warsaw Convention only if injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to passenger)).
372 917 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990).
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and then lost once in its possession.3 73 Emery contended
that a practical interpretation of "transportation by air"
would extend coverage to include the storage of cargo at
a place outside the airport, until the time when the goods
were picked up by the consignee pursuant to the carriage
contract. Emery also suggested that its warehouse should
be deemed to be functionally part of the airport. The trial
court agreed with Emery and assessed damages according
to the limitations of the Convention.
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected Emery's position. The court held "as the plain language of Article 18
directs, 'transportation by air' would include a loss occurring while the cargo was in the air or on the ground but
within the confines of the airport's boundaries".
Consequently, the case was reversed and remanded for a new
trial.
In Onyeanusi v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. ,375 the
Third Circuit held that human remains shipped via an international air carrier qualified as "goods" subject to the
Warsaw Convention. 3 7 6 The plaintiff had made arrangements with Pan American World Airways, Inc. (Pan Am)
to ship his mother's remains from New York to Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The remains were delayed and when finally arrived were damaged and decomposed. The
plaintiff gave written notice of the claim two months after
receipt of the remains; however, Pan Am rejected the
claim as untimely.
Under the Warsaw Convention, damage of goods must
Article 18, § 3 provides in pertinent part:
The period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any transportation by land, by sea or by river performed outside an airport.
If, however, such transportation takes place in the performance of a
contract for transportation by air, for the purpose of loading, delivery or transshipment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to
the contrary, to have been the result of an event which took place
during the transportation by air.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 349, art. 18, § 3.
374 Victoria Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 707.
375 952 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1992).
376 Id.
-73
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be reported within seven days of receipt, and delayed delivery of baggage and goods must be reported in writing
within fourteen days of receipt. 377 Failure to comply with
the timing requirements precludes an action against the
carrier, save actions for fraud. 378 The plaintiff asserted
that human remains were neither baggage nor goods and
therefore the Convention's timing rules were inapplicable. The court disagreed. The court noted "goods" was a
translation of the French word "marchandises" which had
been interpreted as "anything able to be the object of a
commercial transaction. '379 The court observed that
there was in fact a market for human tissue and organs
and other parts of the human body; thus human remains
fit within the definition of "goods. 3 8 0 The court also
held that a policy of limiting the potential liability of air
carriers would be frustrated by excluding "goods" whose
commercial values were difficult to determine.3 ' Such a
construction "would exempt a significant number of
claims from the Convention, thus exposing air carriers to
inestimable liability. "382
The court further rejected the plaintiff's assertion that
Pan Am's willful misconduct avoided the notice requirements of the Convention. The court held such misconduct would only excuse the Convention's limitations on
monetary liability, not the requirements of notice. 3 Because the plaintiff had failed to give timely notice of the
damage to his mother's corpse as a prerequisite for maintaining an action, Pan Am's motion for summary judgment was properly granted.
311Warsaw

Convention, supra note 349, art. 26(s)(3).
Id. art. 26(4).
7.9Onyeanusi, 952 F.2d at 791 (citation omitted).
380 Id. at 792.
I at 793.
Id.
378

382

Id.

383

Id. at 794.
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DISCRIMINATION

In Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc. ,384 the court held that
emotional distress damages were available to a private
plaintiff who sued under the Air Carrier Access Act of
1986 (ACAA).385 Under the particular circumstances of
the case neither injunctive relief, nor recovery of punitive
damages, were appropriate. 86 The case arose when
Shinault, a thirty-year-old quadriplegic, was denied permission to deplane first, along with other passengers who
were in danger of missing their connecting flights.
Shinault was forced to deplane last. Shinault's connecting
flight was also delayed. Once Shinault arrived at the connecting gate, he was denied boarding even though the airplane had not yet left the gate and the jetway was still
open. As a result, Shinault waited five hours before catching the next direct flight. Shinault sued American under
the ACAA alleging American discriminated against him
by not allowing him to board his connecting flight because he was handicapped. Shinault sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, emotional distress damages,
and punitive damages. The district court granted American's motion for summary judgment.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court. As an initial matter, the court rejected American's motion to affirm
on the alternative ground that Shinault had presented no
evidence of discrimination. The court held that a jury
could conclude that, but for Shinault's handicap and the
additional time required to get him aboard the airplane,
387
American would have allowed him to board the flight.
The court also rejected American's assertion that private remedies under the ACAA should be the same as private remedies under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
384

936 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1991).

38, Id. (citing Pub. L. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C.A. app. § 1374(c) (Supp. 1991)).
386 Shinault, 936 F.2d at 805.
387

Id. at 800.
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of 1973.388 Instead, the court held that the ACAA allowed
a private plaintiff to recover all necessary and appropriate
remedies to place him in as near as the same position as
possible that he would have occupied if the wrong had not
been committed. 8 9 Therefore, the court held that the
ACAA allowed recovery of compensatory damages and
emotional distress damages.3 9 0 However, the court held
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction3 9g precluded a
finding that the ACAA provided injunctive relief to
Shinault. The court deterined Shinault's interest was insufficient to exceed that of the Department of Transportation 392 because it was unlikely that Shinault would
encounter the same set of circumstances again. The court
also declined to determine whether punitive damages
were available under the ACAA because Shinault had not
alleged the type of wanton and malicious conduct necessary to recover punitive damages.
E.

MISCELLANEOUS

In 0'Toole v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , an airline agent
told a plaintiff to run as fast as she could to catch a connecting flight. Subsequently, the plaintiff claimed breathing-related injuries resulting from having to run the
length of twenty-three gates. The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and held that
"[a]bsent any indication that the passenger is ailing, the
community standard clearly does not view running as a
388 Id. at 803-04; see Pub. L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 335 (codified as amended 29
U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (Supp. 1991) (the Act permits injunctive relief and declaratory
relief, as well as monetary awards in the form of back pay).
389Shinault, 936 F.2d at 804.
390

Id.

91 When legal disputes develop that directly affect an industry subject to regu-

lation, the need arises to integrate the regulatory agency into the judicial decision
making process. One way to accomplish this is to have an agency pass in the first
instance on those issues that are within its competence. Id. (quoting Mississippi
Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 532 F.2d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 1976), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977)).
192 The DOT later promulgated regulations addressing the problems encountered in Shinault. See 14 C.F.R. § 382 (1991).
393 No. CIV.A.89-1704-S, 1990 WL 198422 (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 1990).
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94

In In re Air Crash at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Detroit,
Michigan on August 16, 1987,395 the court held that an interstate carrier can relieve itself from liability on its travel
passes for ordinary negligence. 96 Any conduct which is
beyond ordinary negligence cannot be contractually released from liability, however, regardless of whether it is
characterized as gross negligence, wanton or willful misconduct or willful and wanton negligence. 97
VIII.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
A.

STATUTES OF REPOSE

In Carr v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,39a the court determined

that Arizona's statute of repose was constitutional and
thus precluded the plaintiffs' product liability action.3 99
Can- arose out of death and injuries incurred on October
2, 1988, when a 1969 Beech aircraft burst into flames after landing short of the runway at Scottsdale, Arizona.
The plaintiffs filed product liability actions against Beech,
the aircraft manufacturer. Beech moved for summary
judgment claiming that Arizona's 12-year statute of repose 40 0 for product liability actions had expired. The
plaintiffs contended that the statute was unconstitutional
and unenforceable. The court held that the plaintiffs'
claims were foreclosed because they had specifically been
rejected by the Arizona Supreme Court.40

The court also

held that the statute of repose did not violate the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because
it was rationally related to the state legislature's purpose
3395
3397
s98
34-

Id. at *2.
756 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
Id. at 324.
Id. at 326.
758 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Ariz. 1991).
Id. at 1332.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1992).
401 See Bryant v. Continental Conveyor & Equip. Co., 751 P.2d 509, 513 (Ariz.
1988) (holding Arizona statute valid under the Arizona Constitution).
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of controlling a perceived tort liability crisis.4 °2 Additionally, the court held that the statute did not deprive the
plaintiffs of a fundamental property right by precluding a
strict liability in tort action before the claim even accrued.4 °3 The court held that "[d]ue process is not implicated by such statutes because there is no tort cause of
action, and therefore no vested property right upon which
to base a Fourteenth Amendment
due process challenge,
'40 4
until an injury actually occurs.
B.

TOLLING

In Palmer v. Borg-Warner Corp.,405 the court held that the
period of limitations for a products liability suit, as a matter of law, commences upon notification of an airline
crash.40 6 In Palmer, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death
action arising from an airplane crash. Two years and nine
days after the plaintiff became aware of the crash, the
plaintiff filed a products liability suit alleging that a defective carburetor had caused the crash. The defendant
moved to dismiss the case because the two-year period of
limitations had expired. The court interpreting its holding in Mine Safety Appliances v. Stiles, 40 7 held that "[u]pon
notification of an airplane crash, a reasonable person has,
as a matter of law, enough information to be alerted that
she 'should begin an inquiry' concerning a potential cause
of action against the pilot, the carrier or the manufacturer. ' 40 8 The court rejected arguments that the plaintiff
did not know of and could not have known of the defective carburetor until a later date. The court held "[i]f inquiry, diligently pursued, would have revealed sufficient
information to justify filing within the two-year limitations
period, we see no basis for equitably tolling the statutory
402Carr, 758 F. Supp. at 1334.
403 Id. at 1334-35.
404Id.at 1334 (citations omitted).
405 818 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1990).
4- Id. at 634.
407 756 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1988).
408 Palmer, 818 P.2d at 634.
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40 9

time limitation.
A strongly worded dissent noted that under the majority formulation, "in order to act reasonably a claimant
must begin an immediate investigation of all possible
causes of an accident, no matter how far-fetched, comparatively unlikely, or well-concealed they may be."'41 0 The
dissent argued that formulation had been implicitly rejected in Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter Int'l.4 '
IX.
A.

DAMAGES

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

In In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21,
1988,412 the Second Circuit, applying federal common
law, held that punitive damages were not recoverable in
actions governed by the Warsaw Convention. 4 3 The
court reviewed the Convention's purposes, structure, and
history and explored the role of punitive damages in
American law generally. In light of its analysis, the court
held that "the Convention preempts state causes of action
because differences in the various state law - some of
which view punitive damages as penal in nature, some
compensatory, and some both - would introduce such
great confusion into the subject as to destroy any hope of
uniformity in applying the Convention.9 414
The court next held that because air carrier liability is a
uniquely international problem requiring uniform interpretation, the Convention must be interpreted according
to federal common law. 41 5 The court adopted the federal
common law of torts and determined that federal common law did not contemplate a compensatory element in
409
410

Id.
Id. at 638 (Compton, J., dissenting).

694 P.2d 143, 146 (Alaska 1984).
928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Rein v. Pan Am World Airways,
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
41 Id. at 1269-70.
4,

412

414

415

Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1278.

1992]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

a punitive damages claim.41 6 It remained, therefore, to
determine whether the Convention permitted punishment
of a defendant and deterrence of certain kinds of conduct
by allowing punitive damages. The court held no intent
existed because: (1) Article 17 referred to "actual harm
caused by an accident rather than generalized legal damages; ' '4 17 (2) it was highly unlikely that Article 24(2) 4 18 was
intended by its drafters to preserve a common law right to
punitive damages; and (3) the "unlimited liability for willful misconduct" provision of Article 25 was meant only to
refer to unlimited liability for compensatory damages.4 9
Furthermore, the court held that allowing recovery of
punitive damages would undermine the policy considerations underlying the Convention. 420 First, the goal of establishing a uniform carrier liability regime would be
defeated because no other country had awarded punitive
damages under the Convention. Second, the goal of making airlines insurable would be defeated because if an airline could not find an insurer willing to sell insurance for
punitive damages, it might choose to terminate international flights rather than risk bankruptcy with every flight.
Third, the availability of punitive damages would defeat
the goal of compensating plaintiffs quickly with a minimum of litigation because every plaintiff would claim willful misconduct.
Similarly, in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1,
416

Id. at 1280.

417Id. at 1281.
4 Article 24 provides:

(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 [baggage claims] any
action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject
to the conditions and limits set out in this convention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding
paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to
who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are
their respective rights.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 349, art. 24.
1"9Warsaw Convention, supra note 349, art. 17.
420 Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d at 1280.
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1983,421 the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention to exclude recovery for
punitive damages.4 22 The litigation arose out of a crash
when a Boeing 747 airliner was shot down over the Sea of
Japan by one of the Soviet Union's SU- 15 interceptor aircraft, killing all 269 persons on board. Ajury awarded the
plaintiffs both actual and punitive damages. On appeal,
the court vacated the $50 million punitive damages
award. 423 The court held that the language "liable for
damage sustained" strongly implies that the carrier's responsibility is compensatory and extends only to the reparation of loss from the death or injury of passengers.424
The court held that "damage sustained" referred to actual
harm, not legal damages.425 Additionally, the requirement that the damage sustained resulted from an accident
aboard the aircraft reinforced the conclusion that recovery was available only for actual loss since an accident cannot cause punitive damages.426
In Hospital Authority of Gwinnett County v. Jones,427 on remand from the United States Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court of Georgia reconsidered and reinstated
its previous judgment that an award of nominal damages
of $5,001 and punitive damages of $1.3 million was not
unconstitutionally excessive. 28 O'Kelley, the plaintiff's
decedent, was severely burned in an automobile accident
and taken by ambulance to a nearby hospital. Shortly
thereafter, in accordance with hospital policy, O'Kelley
was airlifted by helicopter to a hospital with a burn unit.
Enroute, the helicopter crashed. O'Kelley was slightly in42. 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Dooley v. Korean Airlines Ltd.,
112 S. Ct. 616 (1991).

42 Id. at 1484-85.
423 Id. at 1491.
424 Id.

at 1485 (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 349, art. 17).

425 Id.
426 Id. at 1486.
427 Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett County, Georgia v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501 (Ga.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1175 (1992) [hereinafter Hospital II].
428 Id. at 502.
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jured in the crash but died several days later as a result of
his original burn injuries.
In its first consideration of the case, the Georgia
Supreme Court approved the jury award. 429 The court
found that there need be no relationship between the injury and the amount of punitive damages under Georgia
law, the sole exception to this being damages awarded for
wounded feelings. 430 The court observed that the Hospital Authority's policy of bypassing continued care at a
nearby non-participating hospital and diverting patients
to the Hospital Authority's own hospitals "supports a
jury's finding of wanton disregard for the rights, and a
conscious indifference to the best interest, of its injured
patients."4 3 '
The United States Supreme Court granted the Hospital
Authority's writ of certiorari, then vacated the judgment
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip.432 On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court noted that
[w]hile the Supreme Court in Haslip analyzed the punitive
damages award by comparing it to the actual award, nothing in the opinion mandates such a comparison. In fact,
the Court approved the Alabama review standards which
include 'whether there is a reasonable relationship between
the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result
from the defendant's43conduct
as well as the harm that ac3
tually has occurred.'
The court held the award was not excessive because the
actual harm to O'Kelley was slight, but the potential harm
to patients in other circumstances supported the punitive
429 Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 386 S.E.2d 120 (Ga. 1989), cert.
granted andjudgment vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991) [hereinafter Hospital I]. The
court held the award of nominal damages was supported because O'Kelley would
not have received the additional slight injuries but for the unwarranted transportation. Id. at 123.
430 Id.
431Id. at 122.
432 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
4, Hospital I1, 409 S.E.2d at 503.
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damages award.434 The court stated:
Surely the process is not rendered unconstitutional by
permitting the deterrence of potentially dangerous conduct at a point in time when the injury is slight and when
only nominal damages may be involved. Society's interest
would seem better served by deterring objectionable conduct at the first opportunity so that the potentially greater
injury which might otherwise be caused by such conduct
might be avoided.435
B.

BURDEN OF PROOF

In Fariav. M/V Louise,43 6 the Ninth Circuit held the indemnitee bears the burden of apportioning damages in an
indemnity case where the underlying settlements covered
multiple accidents, only some of which involved claims
against the indemnitor 3 7 The underlying action involved claims by two employees against their employer,
Louise V, for injuries arising out of two accidents involving McDonnell-Douglas helicopters and two accidents
having no connection with McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company (MDHC) .438 The employer paid the employees lump sums of $60,000 and $112,500 respectively
in good faith settlement of their claims. The settlement
agreement did not apportion the amounts among the accidents nor was apportionment discussed at the settlement hearing. Subsequently, the employer sued MDHC
for indemnity and demanded reimbursement of the entire
settlement to the first employee and $87,500 out of the
second settlement. The district court found for the employer and awarded reimbursement as requested, plus
costs and fees and denied MDHC's motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court rejected the employer's contention that once it had submit434

Id.

435
436

Id.

945 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1991).

437 Id. at 1143.
438 MDHC is the

successor in interest to Hughes Helicopters, Inc. a subsidiary
of McDonnell-Douglas Corp.
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ted the settlement figures and proven the amounts were
paid, it was incumbent upon the indemnitor to introduce
evidence that the representation of damages was inaccurate or inappropriate. The court noted that a good faith
settlement might create a rebuttable presumption as to
the facts upon which the settlement was based.4 9 However, a good faith settlement did not create a presumption
that damages had been apportioned among claims where
no such apportionment was made in connection with the
settlement. 440 Because the employer had failed to point
to any evidence before the district judge to support an apportionment of damages, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
entered judgment for MDHC.44 t
C.

PECUNIARY DAMAGES

In Das v. RoyalJordanianAirlines,'"2 the court held that a
travel agent was liable for consequential damages which
resulted when it issued confirmed tickets to a passenger
who was in fact on a wait list. 44 3 Bengal, the travel agency,
confirmed Das for a flight to Calcutta, India; however, the
flight was subsequently cancelled by Royal Jordanian.
When Royal Jordanian reinstated the flight, Bengal obtained a new reservation for Das as a wait-listed passenger. When Das complained about his status, Bengal
issued tickets showing confirmed space. The details on
the tickets were handwritten, not computer-generated.
When Das arrived at the airport, Royal Jordanian refused
to honor the tickets. Bengal asserted that holders of confirmed tickets on the original flight should be entitled to
the same status on the reinstated flight. The court rejected that contention because the obligation did not exist
in the aviation industry.4 '" The court held that Bengal
439 Faria, 945 F.2d at 1143-44; see H.S. Equities v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 661 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1981).
440 Faria, 945 F.2d at 1144.
441 Id. at 1145.
442 766 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y.

443 Id. at 171.
444 Id. at 170.

1991).
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was Das' agent and as such owed a duty of due care to
Das.4 4 5 Consequently, Das was entitled to recover the
cost of the tickets, the costs incurred due to being delayed
an additional day, and $1,000 for the emotional distress
Bengal inflicted on Das by its actions.44
In Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Ageloff,447 the Florida Supreme
Court held the term "net accumulations" under the Florida Wrongful Death Act 448 excluded investment income,
but included the investment return on future savings.4 4 9
Ageloff, who had died in an airline crash, was unmarried
and had no dependents. Ageloff's experts testified that
Ageloff would have continued to reinvest 25% of his
gross earnings into his family's toy business. They testified that the present value of the loss of prospective net
accumulations to Ageloff's estate was between two and
three million dollars. Delta contended that the investment yield on future savings constituted "income from investments continuing beyond death" and was therefore
excluded from the definition of "net accumulations". The
court held "net accumulations" included the investment
income on the future savings and affirmed.450
D.

COSTS AND FEES

In Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,451 the court held a
deposition which was used at trial to impeach or refresh
the recollection of a witness was not "necessary" for the
purpose of awarding costs to the losing litigant.452 The
court remarked that "[i]f a witness admits making a contradictory statement during a deposition, we fail to see
why it is necessary to use the deposition at trial. Likewise,
445Id. at 171.

Id.
447552 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 1989).
446

448FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.16-.27 (West 1991).
449Ageloff, 552 So.2d at 1092.
4- Id. at 1089.

45,441 N.E.2d 318 (Ill. 1982).
452 Id. at 322 ("the test for when the expense of a deposition is taxable as costs
is its necessary use at trial").
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we do not believe that any attempt to refresh recollection,
45
no matter how minor the issue, is a necessary use.1 X.

INSURANCE COVERAGE
A.

PILOT QUALIFICATIONS

In United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Cash Air,
Inc.,4 USAU sought a declaration that coverage was not
available for injuries or damages caused by a crash of its
insureds' Piper Seneca. It was uncontested that the pilot,
Covich, did not have the experience as a pilot that was
required in the pilot experience warranty of the policies.
Following the majority view, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held "the USAU policy requirements
concerning pilot experience were intended to be conditions precedent to the existence of coverage. '45 5 Similarly, the court held that, even when the loss was not
caused by a breach of that policy condition, an insurer is
entitled to rely on a policy provision that unambiguously
makes coverage dependent on the pilot of the aircraft
meeting particular experience standards.4 56
Consequently, the court held "the explicit condition
precedent of pilot experience serves a worthwhile purpose, and it is irrelevant whether the breach caused
the
457
loss for which a claim is made under the policy.
B.

CONTRACT LANGUAGE

1. Ambiguous Terms
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v.
Hudson Energy Co.,458 the Supreme Court of Texas construed an insurance policy not to exclude coverage for simultaneous piloting of an aircraft by a qualified and an
Id.
- 568 N.E.2d 1150 (Mass. 1991).
455 Id. at 1152.
456 Id.
457 Id.
458 811 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1991).
453
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unqualified pilot. 45 9 Hudson, the insured, purchased a
Cessna P-210 with dual controls. During a lesson with his
instructor, the air traffic controller instructed Hudson to
land on a runway that required him to make a steep descent. As the airplane was landing, it began to bounce
and the instructor assisted Hudson by operating the second set of instruments. Inexplicably, the Cessna veered
off the runway into the sod and flipped over when its nose
gear sheared off.
Hudson filed a claim under his insurance policy to recover for damage to the plane. The insurance policy required that when in flight, the aircraft was to be piloted
either by Hudson, provided he was a "private pilot," 460 or
by any "private or commercial pilot."146 ' The jury found
that although Hudson was not qualified because he was
only a student pilot, the instructor was qualified. National
Union asserted that denial of coverage was proper because the policy excluded coverage when an unqualified
pilot was at the controls, even if a qualified pilot was simultaneously piloting the aircraft. Conversely, Hudson
asserted that the policy merely required that a qualified
pilot be at the controls, and that it did not matter if an
unqualified pilot was also at the controls.
The court held that the policy was ambiguous because it
did not expressly address the situation in which the aircraft was piloted by a qualified pilot and by a pilot other
than a qualified pilot. 462 Under Texas law, an ambiguous
insurance policy is construed according to any reasonable
interpretation of the contract terms advanced by the in459 Id. at 554-55.
4Id. at 554. Hudson's "private pilot" status required that he was properly
certified by the FAA, having had a minimum of 213 logged flying hours and hav-

ing received 15 hours of dual instruction from a properly certified pilot prior to
solo. Id.
461 Id. To qualify for this status, the pilot was to be instrument rated with a
minimum of 750 logged flying hours, including 150 hours in retractable gear aircraft and 15 hours in the make and model of the aircraft to be insured. Id.
462

Id. at 555.
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sured.463 Hudson's construction was reasonable because
National Union knew that the aircraft had dual controls.
Therefore, it was incumbent on the insurer to expressly
exclude simultaneous piloting from the scope of coverage. 464 Alternatively, the court held that coverage was
available because the instructor was acting as the "pilot"
since he was effectively in control of the Cessna throughout its flight.465
In Avemco Insurance Co. v. McCrone,466 the court held that
the term "child" was ambiguous and could not be applied
to limit the insurer's liability to the insured's adult son
who was killed in an airplane accident.4 6 7 The insured's
policy limited liability to an insured person's parent or
child to 12% of the limit for each person, (i.e. $100,000)
but not more than $12,500. The court maintained that
the term "child" could reasonably be construed to mean
"minor child" or simply refer to the relationship to the
insured.468 Consequently, the court construed the ambiguous provision in favor of the insured and awarded the
full $100,000.
In Jordan v. NationalAccident Insurance Underwriters Inc.,469
the court refused to decide whether the insured decedent's status should be determined at the moment of impact or at some point before the death or injury
occurred.470 Instead, the court held that the policy was
ambiguous and construed it in favor of the insured.4 7 ' In
Jordan, the insured's policy expressly limited coverage to
injuries incurred while riding as a passenger (and not as a
pilot or member of the crew). Jordan had been taking a
refresher course in IFR flying from Page, an experienced
465 Id.; see Ramsay v. Maryland Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex.
1976).
4- Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d at 555.
465 Id.
4- 756 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. I1. 1991).
467

44470

471

Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1076-77.

922 F.2d 732 (11 th Cir. 1991).

Id. at 735.
Id.
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instructor. The plane lost power upon final approach and
Page took the controls. Page attempted to land the plane
but it struck power lines and Jordan was killed in the ensuing crash. The court held that the policy was ambiguous
because it did not define the terms "pilot," "passenger"
or "member of the crew." '472 The court noted that while
some courts have adopted the "moment of impact" test in
construing those terms, 473 others have rejected it.4 74 The
court remarked that "[u]nder Alabama law, if an insurance contract provision is subject to more than one interpretation, it should be construed in favor of coverage, and
4 75
against the insurer.9
The court also noted that under Alabama law the general rule is that the insured bears the burden of proving
coverage.476 When the insurer denies coverage under an
exclusionary clause, however, the insurer bears the burden of proving that the exclusion applies.477 When the
insurer contended that the insured was not expressly covered, it was attempting to place the claim within the provision of the policy excluding all injuries arising from
aviation accidents regardless of whether the insured was
riding as a passenger or otherwise, unless coverage was
expressly provided. Because the insurer denied coverage
under an exclusionary clause, the court held that the insurer bore the burden of proving that the exclusion
applied.4 78
In Gonzalez v. Mission American Insurance Co. ,479 the court
held that an endorsement limiting recovery for "bodily in472

Id.

47- See

Vander Laan v. Educators Mut. Ins. Co., 97 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. 1959).

474See Beckwith v. American Home Assurance Co., 565 F. Supp. 458 (W.D.N.C.

1983).
475 Jordan, 922 F.2d at 735 (quoting Colbert County Hosp. Bd. v. Bellefonte Ins.
Co., 725 F.2d 651, 654 (11th Cir. 1984)).
476 Id. (citing Colonial Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Collins, 194 So. 2d 532,
535 (Ala. 1967)).
477Id. (citing Burton v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 533 F.2d 177, 178
(5th Cir. 1976), citing Fleming v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co.,
310 So. 2d 200, 202 (Ala. 1975)).
478 Id. at 736.
479795 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. 1990).
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jury" to $100,000 per passenger did not also limit recovery for death to $100,000.40 The court held that "death"
and "bodily injury" were not identical terms for coverage
purposes.48 ' Consequently, the plaintiffs were entitled to
recover up to $1,000,000, the aggregate amount of coverage under the policy.
2.

Unambiguous Terms

In Monarch Insurance Co. v. Heatherly,482 the Supreme
Court of New York, Trial Division, held that an insured's
Agriplan Aerial Applicator's Insurance Policy did not provide third party coverage for injuries resulting from the
accidental spraying of herbicides and fungicides. 43 The
policy offered seven types of liability coverage, including
Chemical Liability. However, the insured purchased only
Bodily Injury and Property Damage coverage, both of
which expressly excluded Chemical Liability. When the
insured was subsequently sued by a neighbor for both
negligently spraying and for failing to warn of the spraying, the insurer refused to defend and sought a declaration of its rights. The court held that the unambiguous
language of the policy excluded coverage for accidental
spraying, 484 and furthermore, the failure to warn arose
out of the use of chemicals and was similarly excluded.
In Marine Midland Leasing Corp. v. Chautauqua Airlines,
Inc.,485 the court declared that under the clear and unambiguous language of the parties' lease, the lessor was entitled to receive and retain the insurance proceeds from the
loss of its aircraft, to the extent that such proceeds exceeded the fair market value or casualty value of the air480

Id. at 736.

481 Id.

at 736-37.
560 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1990).
485 Id. at 746.
484 Id. "No coverage applies to bodily injury which is caused by or arises out of
the use of chemicals ...[or] resulting directly or indirectly from chemicals, fertilizers or seeds." Id.
485 572 N.Y.S.2d 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
482
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craft, whichever was greater.48 6 Chautauqua Airlines,
Inc., the lessee, had procured insurance in an amount
clearly greater than either of those values; however,
Marine Midland, the lessor, refused to sign the proof of
loss unless it also received any excess proceeds. The
proof of loss for damage was $2.5 million and the casualty
value was $1,445,903.63. The court held that the lessee
would be entitled to any excess; however, the court remitted the matter because the record lacked proof concerning the fair market value of the aircraft.48 7
C.

CAB ENDORSEMENT

In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Southeast Airmotive
Corp. ,488 North Carolina Court of Appeals held an insurer's claim for reimbursement was not a claim which existed at the time the complaint was served in the previous
declaratory judgment action.489 Consequently, the claim
was not barred by issue preclusion. The suit arose as a
result of the crash of a Southeast Airmotive Corp. (Southeast) aircraft en route to Douglas International Airport in
Charlotte, North Carolina. Southeast tendered its defense to U.S. Fire who refused the tender. Southeast obtained ajudgment declaring that U.S. Fire was required to
provide coverage. U.S. Fire subsequently defended and
incurred expenses in the amount of $80,499.48.
U.S. Fire thereafter sued Southeast for reimbursement
of its litigation costs. Southeast filed a motion to dismiss,
alleging that the subject of U.S. Fire's complaint was previously joined as an issue in the prior action, and that the
subject of the complaint was in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim which should have been brought in the prior
action and was therefore barred. The trial court granted
Southeast's motion and U.S. Fire appealed.
The court of appeals noted that the underlying policy
487

Id. at 574.
Id. at 574-75.

488

402 S.E.2d 466 (N.C. App.), review denied, 407 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1991).

489

Id. at 468.

4-
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contained a CAB endorsement 490 and that Southeast's liability had resulted from an ambiguity in that endorsement. 49 ' The court held that a claim for reimbursement
could arise only if coverage resulted from the presence of
the CAB endorsement. 492 Therefore, a claim for reimbursement could not be a coverage related claim which
existed at the time of serving the complaint in the previous action. As -such, it could not be in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim.493 The court held that the issue of reimbursement was neither raised nor disposed of
in the prior action because it was distinct from the issue of
coverage.49 4 Consequently, the court determined that the
claim could not be barred by issue preclusion, reversing
the trial court's order.
D. POLICY RENEWAL
In Avemco Insurance Co. v. Medicalodges, Inc. , the court
held that the insured did not accept the insurer's offer to
renew a noncommercial aircraft policy within a reasonable
time.496 In November, 1987, the insured received an invitation to renew since the policy was to expire on December 1, 1987. On December 11, 1987, the aircraft was
damaged when the engine was started. On December 19,
1987, the insured elected to renew the policy, but
backdated its check to December 1, 1987. The insurer denied liability because it asserted the policy had expired on
December 1, 1987, and was not in force on the 11th.
4- See 14 C.F.R. § 298.41 (1991) (requiring a CAB standard endorsement as
part of a policy of insurance). The endorsement provided: "The named insured
will promptly reimburse the insurer for payments made by the insurer which the
insurer would not have been obligated to make except for the provisions of this
endorsement." Southeast Airmotive Corp., 402 S.E.2d at 467.
491 Southeast Airmotive Corp., 402 S.E.2d at 467.
492 Id.
495 See Faggart v. Biggers, 197 S.E.2d 75, 78 (N.C. App. 1973) (a counterclaim is
compulsory when it is in existence at the time of the serving of the pleading, when
it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, and when it does not require
the presence of third parties over whom the Court cannot acquire jurisdiction).
4- Southeast Airmotive Corp., 402 S.E.2d at 468.
495 752 F. Supp. 397 (D. Kan. 1990).
496 Id. at 398.
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The court noted that the policy did not include a clause
stating the period for which the policy extended its offer
to renew.497 The court resolved the ambiguity by imposing an implied term of tendering the premium for renewal
"within a reasonable time. ' 498 The court held, however,
that the insured did not accept the insurer's offer within a
reasonable time. 49 9 The insured accepted the offer only
as a result of the aircraft accident. The court stated
"[a]lthough a delay of this length under different circumstances might be acceptance within a reasonable time, the
court has no difficulty in concluding that defendant's acceptance after the accident simply came too late." 500
E. MISCELLANEOUS
In Dickman Aviation Services v. United States Fire Insurance
Co.,° Dickman was sued for breaching a contract to provide a factory-like new Cessna 210 airplane to McKoane.
Dickman damaged the aircraft's engine during the overhaul which resulted in an additional charge of $10,561.50.
McKoane sued Dickman, who tendered the defense to
U.S. Fire, which declined to defend the action because the
loss did not result from "an occurrence." Some time
later, McKoane served Dickman an amended complaint
alleging Dickman's negligence caused the damage. Dickman failed to inform U.S. Fire of the amended complaint.
Instead, the parties appeared before the court and judgment was entered for McKoane. Subsequently, Dickman
sued U.S. Fire to recover the money it paid in satisfaction
of the judgment.
The court held that a liability insurer was not bound by
the judgment against the insured on the negligence count
of the amended complaint.50 2 The court noted the origiId.
Id. (relying on Shepard v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 504 P.2d
228, 230 (Kan. 1972)).
4- Id. at 398.
5- Id. at 399.
50 809 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. 1991).
497
198

502

Id. at 153.
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nal complaint contained other theories of liability which
were outside the policy's coverage.5 °3 Thus, denial of
tender was proper. The insurer was not liable because
the insured had breached the terms of the policy by failing
to notify the insurer of the amended complaint and immediately appearing before the court. Consequently, the
court granted the insurer's motion for summary
judgment.
XI.

FAA ENFORCEMENT/LOCAL REGULATION
A.

DUE PROCESS

In Atorie Air, Inc. v. FederalAviation Administration,5 °4 the
court determined that an air cargo company had waived
procedural due process rights by relinquishing its right to
judicial review as provided for in 49 U.S.C. § 1486.505
Due to prior numerous violations of FAA safety regulations, and a current air crash, the FAA's associate regional
counsel asked Atorie to voluntarily surrender the certificates necessary to its operation. 0 6 Atorie surrendered
the certificates after the FAA agreed to return the certificates as soon as Atorie complied with the regulations.
The FAA failed to timely return the certificates because it
purportedly found continued unaddressed violations.
When the FAA finally recertified Atorie and returned its
certificates, Atorie had allegedly lost all of its cargo
contracts.
Atorie sued the FAA for loss of its business. The court
determined that Atorie had negotiated with the FAA conat 152.
942 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 960-61. Section 1486 provides in pertinent part:
ld.
I

(a) Any order .

.

. issued by the [Federal Aeronautics] Board ...

shall be subject to review by the courts of appeals for the United
States ... upon petition.
(d) . . . [U]pon good cause shown and after reasonable notice to
the Board ... interlocutory relief may be granted by stay of the or-

der or by such mandatory or other relief as may be appropriate.
49 U.S.c. app. § 1486 (1988).
.,. See 14 C.F.R. § 121.535(d) (1991).
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cerning its compliance with agency regulations, voluntarily relinquished its certificates to avoid an emergency
suspension order, knowingly refrained from seeking court
review when the FAA failed to return the certificates as
promised, and, instead, attempted to restructure its business.5 0 7 Consequently, Atorie had waived its procedural
due process rights.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that procedural due
process was available to Atorie because the FAA action
complained of could have been subject to appellate review. 50 8 The court rejected Atorie's assertion that because the certificates were voluntarily surrendered, there
was never a final agency action issued. The court noted
that Atorie voluntarily surrendered its certificates and no
emergency order revoking certification had been issued
by the FAA. Therefore, Atorie had a duty to demand
their return. In the absence of a demand, the "FAA was
never obliged to justify its continued holding of the certificates." 50 The court noted that had Atorie made such a
demand, "judicial review of that demand and the FAA's
refusal would have been available under section
1486(a)". 51 o
The Fifth Circuit also agreed with the district court that
Atorie had waived its procedural due process rights. The
court noted that for a waiver to take place "the record
must reflect a basis for the conclusion of actual knowledge
of the existence of the right,... full understanding of its
meaning and clear comprehension of the consequences of
waiver". 5" The court stated that basis was satisfied because Atorie had retained counsel who was a former lawyer with the FAA and was familiar with the applicable
statutes and regulations and who had determined that it
was better to cooperate with the FAA than rock the boat
507

Atorie Air, 942 F.2d at 957.

508

Id.

- Id. at 960.
510 Id.

Id. at 961 (quoting Burno v. City of Denna, 714 F.2d 484, 492-93 (5th Cir.
1983)).
5,1
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by demanding the return of the certificates. 51 2 Consequently, the court held that when Atorie decided not to
51 3
avail itself of its appellate rights, waiver occurred.
B.

APPEAL

In McCarthney v. Busey,514 a divided Sixth Circuit held
that a petitioner's notice of appeal from the issuance of an
emergency revocation order did not start the running of
the sixty-day period in which the National Transportation
51 5
and Safety Board (NTSB) had to render a decision.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued emergency revocation orders charging McCarthney and six
others (petitioners) with intentionally or fraudulently falsifying entries in official records in violation of 14 C.F.R.
§ 61.59(a)(2). The orders were served by certified mail
on Friday, October 26, 1990, and petitioners appealed immediately. Later that day, the FAA faxed the NTSB copies of its motion to consolidate the seven appeals,
enclosing with each an emergency revocation order and
advising that "[t]he Administrator had determined that an
emergency exists" as to each. 5 ' 6 The NTSB stamped the
motion to consolidate received on Monday, October 30,
1990, and rendered its decision fifty-nine days later on
December 28, 1990.
Petitioners argued that the sixty-day period began on
October 26, 1990, the day they filed their notice of appeal. Therefore, the NTSB's action was not timely since
512

Id. at 961..

'I

ld. at 961-62.

947 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1991), modified, 954 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1992).
The statute provides:
[T]he Secretary of Transportation advises the National Transportation Safety Board that an emergency exists and safety in air commerce or air transportation requires the immediate effectiveness of
his order, in which event the order .shall remain effective and the
National Transportation Safety Board shall finally dispose of the appeal within sixty days after being so advised by the Secretary of
Transportation.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) (1988).
516 Busey, 947 F.2d at 1302.
514

515
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the matter was disposed of on the sixty-third day. The
court rejected this argument, holding that the petitioners'
appeal did not satisfy the statutory and regulatory requirements.5 1 7 The court noted that the sixty-day period
did not run until written notification was received from
the Administrator which expressed the "emergency nature of the orders. 5' 1 8 That notice must be sent by the
Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator. Notices of appeal from petitioners were not "advice from the
Secretary" and, therefore, did not begin the running of
the sixty-day period.51 9 Conversely, the notices sent by
the FAA did satisfy the statutory requirements. Because
these latter notices were stamped received on October 30,
1990, the NTSB decision was timely.
C.

FORFEITURE

In In re Forfeiture of One 1980 Cessna T 207-A, 520 the Florida District Court of Appeal held forfeiture of an aircraft
was proper because the owners had knowingly violated a
registration requirement, despite their claim that they
were in the process of having the aircraft inspected and
repaired in order to obtain registration at the time of
seizure. 52 ' The owners, Inverest International, Inc. (Inverest) and Roberto Striedinger, purchased a 1980
Cessna T-207 which displayed French registration numbers from a previous owner. One month after purchase,
the FAA notified the owners of the need to register the
aircraft. Twelve months later, the owners arranged to
have the aircraft repaired and registered through a fixed
base operator. The next month, pursuant to state law,522
517

Busey, 954 F.2d at 1152.

518See Id.; 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) (1988); 49 C.F.R. § 821.55(b) (1992) ("The

procedure set forth herein shall apply as of the date when the Administrator's
written advice of the emergency character of his order has been received by the
Office of Administrative Law Judges or by the Board.")
519 Busey, 954 F.2d at 1152.
520 587 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
521 Id.
522

at 554.

FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 329.10-11 (West 1991).
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Broward County Sheriff's Deputies seized the aircraft
when they discovered that the French registration had expired and the aircraft had not been registered with the
FAA.523
Striedinger and Inverest appealed the forfeiture on the
ground that they did not "knowingly" violate the Florida
forfeiture statute. They asserted they were in the process
of having the aircraft inspected and repaired in order to
obtain registration and furthermore, that they were not
instructed to secure registration by the FBO. The court
disagreed and instead approved the trial court's suggestion that failure to register the aircraft implied some clandestine use. The court held that "[t]he record supports
the trial court's conclusion that appellants knew that the
plane required FAA registration and notwithstanding this,
they knowingly failed to register the plane. ' 524 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
A forceful dissent argued that the majority's formulation impermissibly shifted the burden of proving knowledge to the party opposing forfeiture. The dissent argued
that the burden was on the party seeking forfeiture to allege and prove the owners' intentional act to conceal the
owners' identity. 525 The dissent also included an "Epilogue To Dissent," that commented on subsequent public
knowledge that Striedinger had become a player in the
Noreiga trial because of reported drug smuggling activities. The dissent stated:
This newly reported information had no effect whatsoever
on the work of any judge on the panel as none of that information was in the trial record of the present case being
reviewed on appeal. Accordingly, should the reader consider the dissent to be naive, as is the reader's privilege,
the reader does so without an understanding of appellate
review of trial records, notwithstanding the foregoing
52- Sections 329.10 and 329.11 provide that an aircraft with improper registration may be seized and forfeited under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 932.701-704 (West 1991).
524 Cessna T 207-A, 587 So. 2d at 554.
525 Id. at 556.
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explanation. 2 6
D.

IMPROVEMENT GRANTS

In City and County of San Francisco v. FederalAviation Administration,527 the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA properly denied San Francisco airport improvement grants
under the Airport and Airway Improvements Trust
Fund.52 8 According to the court, the use of noise control
regulations by San Francisco to bar aircraft on a basis
other than noise, 529 or without a factual basis, was inconsistent with a fair and efficient national air transport system.5 3 0 Furthermore, because the FAA violated the 180day limit on its consideration of certain grants,53 ' including refiled grants, the court directed the FAA to approve
grants for certain years.
E.

MISCELLANEOUS

InJanka v. Department of Transportation,National Transportation Safety Board," 2 the Ninth Circuit upheld a finding of
intentional falsification of a logbook entry. 5 " In the consolidated cases, defendant Janka was charged with violating Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.9 for operating
an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner, FAR 91.65(a)
for creating a collision hazard, and FAR 61.59(a) for mak526
527

Id.
942 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1665 (1992).

528

Id. at 1393.

The Airport and Airway Improvements Trust Fund is made up of amounts
equivalent to taxes on aviation fuel and air transportation received by the Treasury. See 26 U.S.C. § 9502 (1988). Money from the Trust Fund is allocated, pursuant to The Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 220127 (1988), to finance the operation and improvement of major airports. Potential
recipients include "primary airports" like San Francisco International Airport. See
id. §§ 2202(a)(12), 2205(a)(2)(B).
- San Francisco rejected applications for retrofitted Boeing 707 airplanes even
though the noise level emitted by those airplanes met federal guidelines. See 49
U.S.C. app. §§ 1423, 1431 (1988).
520 City and County of San Francisco, 942 F.2d at 1395.
531 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 2218(b)(1) (1988).
532 925 F.2d 1147 (9th Cir. 1991).
533 Id. at 1150.
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ing an intentionally false logbook entry.53 4 Janka asserted
that he had not violated FAR 61.59(a) because he lacked
any intent to deceive. The court held that an "intent to
deceive" is only required where the violation charged is
fraudulent falsification of a logbook; whereas the elements of intentional falsification of a logbook were falsity,
knowledge, and materiality.535 Janka also asserted that
the logbook entry was not material. 536 The court adopted
the Sixth Circuit's definition of materiality 53 7 and held
that a logbook entry is material if the statement was capable of influencing the Federal Aviation Administration. 53 8
Consequently, the court affirmed the Board's decision.
XII.
A.

STRICT LIABILITY

DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES

In Bailey v. Pennsylvania Electric Co. ,539 a Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court held that high voltage lines
were a dangerous instrumentality and therefore a power
company owed a high duty of care towards pilots and not
merely an ordinary duty of care. 540 Bailey and Muth, pilots for an air reconnaissance company hired by Pennsylvania Electric Company (Penelec), were engaged in a
routine patrol of a Penelec 46Kv electrical transmission
line. Their helicopter collided with an intersecting unmarked 115Kv line and plunged to the ground killing
Muth and severely injuring Bailey. A jury found Penelec
65% at fault and Penelec moved for a judgment n.o.v.,
which the court denied.
Penelec appealed on the ground that it had no notice of
the dangerous condition. The court, however, following
54

See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.9, 61.59 (1992); 14 C.F.R. § 91.65 (1989).

535 Janka, 925 F.2d at 1150.
56 The entry indicated that Janka gave one hour of instruction in August, when

in fact the instruction took place in May.
5-1 See Cassis v. Helms, 737 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1984).
538Janka, 925 F.2d at 1150.
119 598 A.2d 41 (Pa. 1991).
540 Id. at 43.
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Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. ,54' held that where
there is a likelihood that an aircraft will fly by a transmission line, harm is foreseeable.5 42 The court also noted
that "the fact that Bailey and Muth were retained to perform flight inspections for Penelec is sufficient proof that
the power company was aware that aviation activities
would be taking place over its lines. ' 543
The court further held that high voltage transmission
lines were dangerous instrumentalities which carry a high
probability of death or serious injury if they are not properly marked with spherical line markers.5 44 The court
held Penelec was properly held to a high, not an ordinary,
duty of care because it was responsible for hundreds of
high voltage lines over which pilots fly their aircraft.54 5 In
the present case there was ample evidence for the jury to
conclude that Bailey and Muth were not alerted properly
to the presence of the intersecting transmission line. Because the jury could surmise that the insufficient warning
was the proximate cause of the helicopter crash, judgment
n.o.v. was properly denied.
B.

PREEMPTION

In Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc.,546 the Supreme
Court of Louisiana reversed the en banc opinion of the
court of appeals 547 and held that under the facts of that
instant case, state law was not preempted by, but supplemented general maritime law since the state law did not
"impermissibly conflict with the substantive general mari'
time law." 548
Consequently, a passenger who was injured
in a helicopter crash while being ferried from shore onto
- 123 A.2d 636 (Pa. 1956) (a wrongful death action involving the pilot of a
single engine aircraft who was killed when his aircraft collided with a transmission
line strung across the Susquehanna River by defendant at a height of 185 feet).
-2 Bailey, 598 A.2d at 46.
543 Id.
544 Id. at 46, 51.
5 Id. at 47.
546 593 So. 2d 634 (1992).
-7 576 So. 2d 1183 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
54, Green, 593 So. 2d at 636.
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an offshore production platform was entitled to recovery
under Louisiana's strict liability statute5 49 without proof of
the helicopter owner's negligence.5 5 °
The Supreme Court of Louisiana agreed that admiralty
jurisdiction was invoked because the activity at issue was
traditionally performed by waterborne vessels and involved an accident on the high seas. However, the court
held that when bringing claims under a "saving to suitors" 55 ' clause, it was not necessary to find an exact counterpart to the strict liability provision of the general
maritime law. 552 Instead,
[t]he proper inquiry is whether in this setting strict liability
under Louisiana law thwarts the purpose of any specific
congressional pronouncement, or "work[s] material prejudice to the characteristic features of maritime law or interfere[s] with the proper harmony or uniformity of that law
in its international and interstate relations.553
The requirement of "no specific Congressional pronouncement" was satisfied because the court found no
clearly applicable federal statute "governing the liability
of a helicopter owner to an offshore worker passenger for
injuries sustained by the passenger from a crash landing
on the high seas caused by a defective condition of the
helicopter. ' 55 4 The requirement that there be "no mate&9

LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2317 (West 1991).

Under general maritime law, a vessel owner's exposure to non-seamen passengers is predicated on the theory of negligence. Green, 593 So. 2d at 640; see
MARTINJ. NORRIS, THE LAw OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES, § 3:4 at 63 (4th ed.
1990).
55, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 ("savings to suitors" clause which permits claimants to
pursue common-law remedies in state court).
552 Green, 593 So. 2d at 638. The court of appeals had held that where the remedy sought under state law altered or conflicted with the maritime law which established the substantive rights of the parties, maritime law should control. Such a
conflict existed in the present case because general maritime law required proof
of negligence by a passenger who sues a common carrier, whereas Louisiana's
strict liability statute law had no such requirement. Because plaintiff had not
proven negligence, the court of appeals dismissed plaintiff's claims. Green, 576
So. 2d at 1184.
553 Green, 593 So. 2d at 638.
554 Id.
55"
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rial prejudice" was satisfied because
[g]iven the lack of maritime rule clearly applicable to a helicopter crash on the high seas and the recognition of liability in the absence of fault in the general maritime law,
[the court held that] strict custodial liability embodied in
Louisiana Civil Code article 2317 cannot be said to 'materially prejudice' characteristic features of the general mari555
time law.
Lastly, the requirement that there be no interference with
uniformity of law was satisfied because the tangential relationship of offshore drilling to traditional maritime activities combined with strong state interest brought the case
within the "maritime but local" doctrine.556 Consequently, the trial court did not err in applying state law.
XIII. NEGLIGENCE
In Rodriguez Pardo v. Delta Airlines, Inc. ,557 a federal district court held that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate any genuine issue as to any material fact upon
which a finding of liability against Delta Airlines, Inc.
(Delta)15 8 could rest and granted Delta's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs were paying passengers on
Delta flight 179 from San Juan to Miami. After landing in
Miami and while taxiing towards the gate, a camera case
stored by an unidentified passenger in an overhead compartment fell out and hit one of the plaintiffs on the back
of her neck when the passenger retrieved his belongings.
The plaintiffs alleged that Delta was negligent in failing
to ensure that the compartment was not overloaded.
However, the court noted that the plaintiffs failed to come
forward with any evidence upon which a finding of improper loading could be based. 55 9 The plaintiffs further
555Id. at 642.
556 Id. at 643. The doctrine allows the application of state law "[i]f it (can] be
said that the work activities of the injured employee have no direct concern with
navigation or commerce." Id. (citations omitted).
55, 767 F. Supp. 26 (D.P.R. 1991).
558

Id. at 29.
at 28.

559Id.

1992]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

alleged that Delta was negligent in allowing the unidentified passenger to stand while the "fasten seat belt" sign
was illuminated. However, the court noted that the plaintiff had not produced evidence showing that the crew
failed to order the passenger to sit down, or that there
was time for a flight attendant to instruct him to remain
seated. 560 Finally, the court noted that plaintiffs had not

produced any evidence that any Delta employee was involved in Mrs. Rodriguez Pardo's injury.56 ' Consequently, the court granted Delta's motion for summary
judgment.
In Marshall v. Western Air Lines, Inc. ,562 the Court of Ap-

peals of Washington held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would not relieve a plaintiff of the burden of proving
that the defendant's negligence caused the sudden
changes in cabin air pressure which allegedly harmed the
plaintiff.5 63 The court further maintained that an airline

had no duty to warn of hazards associated with a passenger's particular condition.5 64 In Marshall, the plaintiff alleged Western Air Lines, Inc. (Western) had negligently
caused a sudden change in cabin air pressure while she
was a passenger aboard defendant's aircraft. The plaintiff
alleged the pressure change ruptured the membrane of
her middle ear565 which consequently restricted her lifestyle in that she was no longer able to travel anywhere involving a change of altitude. The trial court rejected the
plaintiff's theory and granted Western's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington affirmed. The court noted that in order for res ipsa loquitur
to apply, the accident producing the injury must be of a
Id.
Id. at 29.
562 813 P.2d 1269, 1269 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 822 P.2d 287 (Wash.
1991).
563 Id. at 1274.
56

561

564 Id. at 1275.
565 Id. at 1271. Plaintiff's medical condition was diagnosed as a perilymph fistula. Id.
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kind that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of
someone's negligence. 6 6 The court held that although a
sudden, abnormal change in cabin air pressure was such
an event, the plaintiff failed to show that the change in air
pressure actually occurred. 567 Therefore, the plaintiff was
not relieved of the burden of proving her case in chief.
Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that Western failed to
warn its passengers of the risks associated with sudden
changes of air pressure in air travel and of the preventive
measures passengers can take to relieve pressure in the
ear. The court held, however, that Western had not
breached any duty to Marshall because an airline had no
duty to warn of risks relating to a passenger's particular
condition. 56 The court noted that the only type of warning that might have helped Marshall was a notice before
the flight that a very small percentage of individuals, for a
variety of reasons, may suffer permanent ear damage due
to normal pressure changes. 569 Even if such a warning
was given, there was no evidence that Marshall's injuries
would have been prevented because Marshall was not
aware of any inner ear problems. Therefore, Marshall's
claim on the theory of duty to warn would fail on the causation element.
In Martin Marietta Corp. v. INTELSA T,5 7° the court held
that a provider of private launch services had no duty in
tort for losses arising out of a failed satellite launch.5
Furthermore, the court held that a contractual waiver to
claims based on gross negligence was consistent with congressional intent requiring parties to assume the risk of
their own loss. 572 In August, 1987, INTELSAT con5Id. at 1273 (quoting Adams v. Western Host, Inc., 779 P.2d 281, 285 (Wash.
App. 1989)).
567 Id..
568 Id. at 1275; see Sprayregen v. American Airlines, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 16
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (no duty to warn a passenger of the hazards of flying with a head
cold).
569 Id.
570 763 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Md. 1991).

571 Id. at 1333.
572 Id. at 1330.
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tracted with Martin Marietta for the launch of two INTELSAT satellites on Titan III launch rockets. The first
launch was unsuccessful because the satellite failed to separate from the rocket at the correct time and could not be
boosted into the proper orbit. INTELSAT sustained substantial losses due to the failure of the mission to position
the satellite correctly.573 Martin Marietta brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment absolving it of any liability for the incident. INTELSAT counterclaimed,
asserting a breach of contract, and alleging negligence,
gross negligence and negligent misrepresentation.
The court rejected Martin Marietta's assertion that the
Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA)5 74 created liability
waivers for contracts in which the parties failed to expressly agree upon any waivers.575 The court agreed that
the CSLA required that the licensee include cross-waivers
in its contract.5 76 However, as a consequence of the failure to include cross-waivers, the Department of Transportation could revoke the license. Nothing in the CSLA
imputed cross-waivers into the contract.5 77 In fact, the
court noted that Martin Marietta's license required it to
certify to the Office of Commercial Space Transportation
that it would indemnify and be responsible for liability if it
failed to enter or include the cross-waivers.578
Although the CSLA did not absolve Martin Marietta of
liability, the court held that INTELSAT's tort claims were
573 Id. at 1329. INTELSAT paid Martin Marietta approximately $112 million for
the launch prices alone, and experts estimated that the cost of rescuing the satellite may be as high as $90 million. Additionally, the satellite does not function at
its present orbit and is useless. Id.
-74 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988). The statute was enacted to reverse the
virtual shut-down of the private commercial space launch industry brought about
because commercial launchers incurred huge liability risks and were unable to
procure insurance at any price. It requires all licensed private launch providers to
enter into reciprocal waivers of claims, under which all parties agree to assume
their own risks of loss.
575 INTELSAT, 763 F. Supp. at 1330.
576 Id.
577 Id.
578

Id.
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invalid in light of the specific contractual obligations.5 7 9
The court noted that "[e]qually sophisticated parties who
have the opportunity to allocate risks to third party insurance or among one another should be held to only those
duties specified by the agreed upon contractual terms and
not to general tort duties imposed by state law." 5' 0 Applying Maryland law, the court dismissed INTELSAT's
claim for negligent misrepresentation because no relationship of special trust existed between the parties.58 '
INTELSAT was not unsophisticated and the contract did
not impose any duty of due care.
The court also rejected INTELSAT's assertion that
public policy invalidated contractual waivers of gross negligence. The court noted that Congress intended the
waivers required by the CSLA to bar recovery in all instances, including gross negligence.58 2 The court found
that "[t]hose who seek to explore, and to exploit, outer
space must do so charged with acceptance of the unknown, and perhaps unknowable, perils to be faced in that
vast and potentially hostile environment.' '583
In Broussard v. Paul Fournet Air Service, Inc. ,584 the court
held that the owner of a private aircraft, which flipped and
was destroyed in a sudden windstorm, failed to prove that
an FBO was negligent in not tying down the plane.58 5
The court noted that the owner had been notified that the
FBO would not maintain the tie-down ropes. Furthermore, the court held that the accident was caused by an
overpowering force and the FBO was not liable for any
519 Id. at 1333-34.
58o Id.

at 1332.

58' Id. at 1333; see Flow Indust. v. Fields Const. Co., 683 F. Supp. 527 (D. Md.

1988) (a claim for negligent misrepresentation is improper when the only relationship between the parties is contractual, both parties are equally sophisticated,
and the contract does not create an express duty of due care in making
representations).
582 INTELSAT, 763 F. Supp. at 1333.
583

Id. at 1334.

574 So. 2d 541 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
,1, Id. at 542.
584
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damage.586
XIV.

DEBTOR-CREDITOR
A.

BANKRUPTCY

In In re Pan Am Corp.,587 plaintiffs, whose decedents died
when Flight 103 crashed over Lockerbie, Scotland,
brought suit against Pan Am in Florida state court. Pan
Am, debtors in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding,
sought to transfer the action to the Southern District of
New York under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). 588 The court recognized that Pan Am's strategy was then to move for the
panel on multidistrict litigation to transfer the action to
the Eastern District of New York where similar cases were
pending.58 9 The court noted that, because Florida had
not yet held that the Warsaw Convention provided the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained during international
air transportation, 590 punitive damages might be recoverable. However, New York courts had held that the Warsaw Convention preempted state law causes of action and
so precluded recovery of punitive damages.5 9 '
The court found the reasoning of In re White Motor
Credit5 92 to be persuasive. There, the Sixth Circuit had
questioned the equity of forcing a debtor to face tort litigation in a foreign forum. The White Motor Credit court
held that "the fact that section 157(b)(4) of title 28
586

Id. at 543.

-7 128 B.R. 59 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 950 F.2d 8839 (2d Cir.
1991).
51128 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1988) provides:
The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful
death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district in which
the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the
bankruptcy is pending.

Id.
589See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
- See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1462, 1482 n.33 (1 th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, Ill S.Ct. 1489 (1991).
-91In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 1928 F.2d 1267
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
592 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985).
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removes tort cases from mandatory abstention under section 1334(c)(2) but does not remove discretionary abstention under 1334(c)(1), convinces us that the district court
has the authority to leave tort cases in the courts in which
they are pending for liquidation there. ' 593 The Pan Am
court found that this reasoning was equally compelling
when applied to a tort plaintiff in an action against a
debtor. The court held that discretionary abstention
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(€)(1) created the authority 594
to
leave tort cases in the courts in which they are pending.
Therefore, notwithstanding the language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 157, the court deemed abstention was proper and denied Pan Am's motion to transfer.59 5
B.

MISCELLANEOUS

In The Connecticut National Bank v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.,596 the court granted Connecticut National Bank's
(CNB) motion for summary judgment, determining that
Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) was not excused from
performing its contractual obligations.59 7 The lawsuit
arose out of a 1986 Equipment Trust Agreement (the
Agreement) between CNB and TWA which provided that
CNB would purchase ten aircraft and approximately
ninety-six jet engines from TWA, then lease them back to
TWA until February 1, 1996. In connection with the
Agreement, CNB received notes with an aggregate principal amount of $312 million. TWA met its obligations until January 31, 1991 at which time it failed to make
payments of approximately $57 million. As provided by
the Agreement, CNB demanded the return of the aircraft
and engines as well as immediate payment of the outstanding balance on the notes. TWA did not make any
payments and did not return CNB's property.
593

Id. at 273.

5595
5597

Pan Am Corp., 128 B.R. at 64.
Id. at 65.
762 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Id. at 81.
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CNB moved for summary judgment seeking specific
performance in accordance with the Agreement's default
remedies. TWA opposed the summary judgment, asserting that it had not been afforded an adequate opportunity
to conduct discovery. The court noted, however, that
TWA did not suggest what additional evidence it needed
to obtain. 9 8 Consequently, the court rejected TWA's naked assertion that the matter9 was too important to enter59
tain a summary judgment.
TWA next asserted that it would be inequitable to require it to return the property in light of the tremendous
ramifications such an order might have on both TWA and
the public. The court refused to accept this argument,
noting that New York law permits a secured creditor to
sue on a debt or foreclose on the collateral. 600 The court
stated that "CNB is more than a secured creditor, it actually owns the property. It would defy logic for [CNB's]
rights to be more limited than those of a secured creditor,
especially when the Agreement specifically affords CNB
this remedy. ' 60 ' The court also rejected TWA's suggestion that CNB would be adequately protected if it secured
a money judgment, commenting that "[i]f TWA had the
money, it presumably would not have defaulted in the first
602
place.
Finally, the court rejected TWA's argument that it
should be excused from satisfying the contract because
the Persian Gulf War resulted in decreased air travel and
increased oil prices, curtailing its cash flow. The court
noted TWA could have negotiated for a force majeure
clause 60 3 in the contract to protect itself in the event of
598 Id. at 79. The court held there was no merit to the claim that CNB was a
"naked trustee" and that further discovery would change that conclusion. Id.
599Id.
600 Id. at 80; see N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-503 (McKinney 1990); MGD Graphic Sys., Inc.

v. New York Press Publishing Co., 52 A.D.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 368
N.E.2d 835 (N.Y. 1977).
601 Connecticut National Bank, 762 F. Supp. at 80.
602 Id.

-1sThe clause would have protected "the parties in the event that a part of the
contract [could] not be performed due to causes which [were] outside the control

100

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[58

such circumstances. Moreover, the court held that the impossibility defense was precluded because "all of the alleged factors impacting upon TWA's profits were clearly
foreseeable and simply represent60 4the risk of doing business in an international forum.
XV.

FREQUENT FLYER PROGRAMS

In TWA, Inc. v. American Coupon Exchange, Inc. ,6o5 the
Ninth Circuit addressed the legal issues surrounding the
enforceability of TWA's tariffs restricting the transfer of
frequent flyer awards.60 6 American Coupon Exchange,
Inc.(ACE), a frequent flyer brokerage house, appealed
from a district court order enjoining its operations.60 7
ACE asserted that the transfer restrictions constituted an
unreasonable restraint on the alienation of property. The
court noted that "the novelty and complexity of the factual setting in which this case arises makes summary judgment on the reasonableness issue inappropriate on
anything less than an exhaustive investigation of the economic realities of the matter. ' 60 8 Thus, because the district court resorted to speculation in important areas of
inquiry, summary judgment was inappropriate.
The district court determined that the policy against restraints on alienation of property applied to TWA's tariff
because the coupons embodied property rights. The
Ninth Circuit, however, held the coupons were "contract
rights" rather than "property rights.16 0 9 The court relied
of the parties and could not be avoided by exercise of due care." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 581 (5th ed. 1979).
6 Connecticut National Bank, 762 F. Supp. at 81.
'o 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990).
60iId. at 678-79. The restriction limited transfer of coupons to persons other
than a family member, legal dependent, or specified relative; and voided certificates transferred to any other party. Id.
7 TWA, Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1476, 1484 (C.D.
Cal. 1988), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990) (granting
TWA's motion for summary judgment and ordering a permanent injunction
against ACE, but staying all injunctive relief pending appeal).
608 American Coupon Exchange, 913 F.2d at 684.
- Id. at 685.
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on analogous cases involving restrictions on transfers of
railroad6 t0 and theater tickets 61 ' in which the courts held
that such issues involved contract rights. Furthermore,
the court noted that "since a frequent flyer award coupon
is not even a ticket; it is merely the right to receive a ticket
upon redemption of the coupon ....this further militates
against classifying these awards as 'property rights'. 61 2
In Greenberg v. United Airlines,6 t3 the trial court dismissed
the plaintiffs' claim for negligent misrepresentation arising out of the Mileage Plus program. The plaintiffs alleged that by changing the terms of its Mileage Plus
frequent flyers program in 1988, United negligently misrepresented the terms of the 1981 Mileage Plus program
in which the plaintiffs were already enrolled. The appellate court held that because the plaintiffs were unable to
allege any injuries suffered, the case was properly
dismissed.

610 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Caffrey, 128 F. Supp. 770 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1904)
("The complaining parties have the right to sell round-trip and commutation tickets over their respective roads at reduced rates, on condition that they shall only
be good in the hands of the original purchasers and shall not be transferred. Contracts of this sort between a carrierand its passengers are lawful." Id. at 772 (emphasis
added)).
611 Collister v. Hayman, 76 N.E. 20 (N.Y. 1905) (Provision on back of Knickerbocker Theater ticket stating "if sold on the sidewalk, this ticket will be refused at
the door." Id. at 20).
612 American Coupon Exchange, 913 F.2d at 688.
613 563 N.E.2d 1031 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 148 (11. 1991).

